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The Skeleton in the Closet: The
Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-
Defense, and Expert Testimony
by Victoria Mikesell Mather*
I. INTRODUCTION
The common practice of wife beating is a 'skeleton in the closet' of
many families today.' In recent years, however, the public has focused
much attention on the phenomenon of the battered woman, bringing the
battering relationship and its consequences to the forefront of American
social consciousness. The numbers are staggering: FBI statistics show that
a husband or boyfriend beats a woman in the United States approxi-
mately every eighteen seconds;2 other sources estimate that somewhere
between two and six million women will be beaten by their mates each
year;2 and experts believe that between one-half and two-thirds of all
marriages will experience at least one battering incident during the rela-
tionship.4 The figures are somewhat speculative since wife beating is still
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1. The author uses the terms wife and woman interchangeably in this Article because
many female victims of battering are not married to their abusers, but live with them.
2. A wide range of such statistics are cited in Moore, Editor's Introduction, in BATTERED
WOMEN 7, 13-14 (D. Moore ed. 1979), in J. FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE 330-32 (1979),
and in D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVEs 11-14 (1976).
3. Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the
Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 273 (1985) (citing Wife Beating: The
Silent Crime, TIME, Sept. 5, 1983, at 23); and G. GOOLKASIAN, CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE: A GUIDE FOR CRIMINAL JusTicE AGENCIES 7 (1986) [hereinafter CONFRONTING DoMSs-
TIC VIOLENCE]. Both authors were drawing from a study by M. STRAUS, R. GELLES & S.
STEINMrz, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 32-33 (1980) (herein-
after BEHIND CLOSED DOORS].
4. See, e.g., L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN ix (1979) [hereinafter THE BATTERED
545
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a drastically under-reported crime.' Often the results of battering become
even more serious. In 1973, FBI statistics showed that one-fourth of all
murders were within the family and one-half of these were spousal kill-
ings.6 In 1979, FBI statistics indicated that husbands or boyfriends killed
forty per cent of all female homicide victims.7 The stories are terrifying,'
and the number of studies on the issue are legion.'
Clearly, society-at-large does not understand the battered woman, the
batterer, and their relationship. This lack of comprehension undercuts so-
ciety's ability to deal with the legal and moral complexities arising from
the abusive relationship. This Article will focus on an important and con-
troversial development in the law affecting battered women. An increas-
ing number of courts admit expert testimony on the battered woman syn-
drome to support a claim of self-defense when a battered woman kills her
abuser. Part II of this Article traces the history of wife abuse, the nature
of the battering relationship, and the legal system's response to battering.
The next section reviews the law of self-defense and analyzes some of the
problems a battered woman encounters when pleading self-defense. Part
IV presents the standards courts use in admitting expert testimony gen-
erally and, more specifically, on the battered woman syndrome. Such tes-
WOMAN]; Moore, supra note 2, at 14; and Straus, A Sociological Perspective on the Preven-
tion and Treatment of Wifebeating, in BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF Do-
MESTIC VIOLENCE 194 (M. Roy ed. 1977).
5. Statistics underestimate the frequency of domestic violence incidents for a number of
reasons. E.g., CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 5-7, cites official reporting
and record-keeping methods as major contributors to the under-reporting problems. D.
MARTIN, supra note 2, at 15-17, calls wife abuse a "skeleton in the closet." She believes that
society itself-the media, social scientists, social services, reformers, the police, the neigh-
bors, the battered woman and her family-all conspire to keep the battering issue out of the
public eye. Id.
6. Statistic cited in J. FLEMING, supra note 2, at 332. Other studies confirm these find-
ings. Several are cited in R. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES 15-19 (1979)
[hereinafter R. DOBASH].
7. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1979 10-11 (1980), cited in Waits, supra
note 3, at 274 n.21. Accord Wolfgang, A Sociological Analysis of Criminal Homicide, in
STUDIES IN HOMICIDE 15, 23 (M. Wolfgang ed. 1967), cited in Schneider, Equal Rights to
Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 626
n.14 (1980).
8. See, e.g., the stories detailed in A. BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 55-74
(1987) and THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 78-184. Victim quotes were also used
extensively in R. DOBASH, supra note 6, at 75-222.
9. See, e.g., L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) [hereinafter THE BAT-
TERED WOMAN SYNDROME] (a study of over 400 battered women); THE DARK SIDE OF FAMI-
LIES (1983) (contains several studies on many aspects of family violence); THE ABUSIVE
PARTNER: AN ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC BATTERING (M. Roy ed. 1982) (contains several studies,
surveys and presentations of treatment programs); BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 4 (consists entirely of studies).
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timony can be, of course, a key factor in a battered woman's proof of a
self-defense claim to a homicide charge. The conclusion then summarizes
the findings and issues discussed in previous sections and makes recom-
mendations designed to mitigate the legal problems this deadly phenome-
non presents.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE BATTERED WOMAN
The battered woman presents a 'problem' for society because almost no
one (including the abused woman herself) can understand why a mature
adult simply does not walk away from an abusive relationship, call the
police when she was attacked, or tell family, friends, and neighbors about
the problem and seek their assistance. The answer is complex, as this sec-
tion will illustrate.
A. History
Wife beating has been a fact of life for centuries. Only in pre-Biblical
times were women sovereign (due to their child-bearing capabilities) and
thus not subject to abuse. Religions revolved around female deities and
the mother figure.' 0 Once men began to realize their importance in pro-
creation, however, society moved from a matriarchal to a patriarchal ori-
entation." Ancient myths 2 and Old Testament Bible passages'3 illustrate
this shift in attitude. By the Middle Ages wife beating was not only a
well-established practice, but encouraged."' Later, the Napoleonic Civil
Code and the English common law also reflected this perspective. Under
Napoleonic rule, women lost all property rights and were 'owned' by their
fathers or their husbands. ' s The English common law contained the infa-
mous 'rule of thumb' that purported to protect wives by limiting the size
10. See R. GRAVES, THE GREEK MYTHS 11-20 (1957) and Davidson, Wifebeating: A Re-
curring Phenomenon Throughout History, in BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, at 2, 4 (M. Roy ed. 1977). For another excellent discussion of the his-
tory wife beating see R. DOBASH, supra note 6, at 31-74.
11. Davidson, supra note 10, at 5; R GRAVES, supra note 10, at 11-23.
12. R. GRAVES, supra note 10, at 11-23.
13. Genesis 3:1-17 (The woman's temptation to eat from the tree ultimately caused the
fall of man); Deuteronomy 25:11-12 (Under the miscellaneous laws, woman's hand was cut
off, if upon rescue of her husband in a fight with another man, she seized the opponent's
genitals); Deuteronomy 22:13-21 (Under the marriage laws, if a woman could not prove her
virginity, she was stoned to death); Judges 19 (In a particularly vicious story, a husband
offered his concubine to a gang of rapists to spare his own life. The gang eventually killed
her. The husband sought revenge, but no fault is ascribed to him in the story, nor is any
compassion expressed for the woman.).
14. Davidson, supra note 10, at 12-14.
15. Id. at 15.
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of the instrument that a husband could use to chastise his wife to a "rod
not thicker than his thumb."1 The United States eventually adopted the
English common law view, 7 but by the late 1800s several states began to
withdraw a husband's right to beat his wife.18
Only recently has there been any sort of concerted public effort to help
battered women. British author and activist Erin Pizzey established the
first shelter for battered women in England in 1971." Pizzey was among
the first to bring the battered woman's plight to public attention. 0 The
concept of a safe house or shelter spread throughout Europe and the
United States, and every shelter that has opened since has quickly filled
to capacity.21 The battered women's movement really did not achieve mo-
mentum in the United States until the mid-1970s when the National Or-
ganization for Women established a Task Force on Battered Women and
Household Violence, and shelters and coalitions began springing up
across the country.22 The battle, however, was only beginning.
B. The Abusive Relationship
Today, largely through the pioneering efforts of Del Martin,28 Lenore
Walker,24 and others, much is known about the parties involved in an
abusive relationship, the dynamics of the relationship, and the nature of
the abuse itself. This section will summarize some of the findings and
theories about domestic abuse.
The Parties. The 'typical' batterer and his victim defy neat categori-
zation. Wife abuse cuts across all social, economic, religious, racial, and
ethnic lines according to official records and unofficial studies." The poor
16. Id. at 18; BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 445-46 (1765).
17. Mississippi was the first state formally to recognize the husband's right to beat his
wife in Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156 (1824). In State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.
Law) 445 (1868), the court did not punish the husband because he used a switch smaller
than his thumb and because the court wanted to avoid interfering with the family relation-
ship. In Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877), the court stated that a woman could not sue
her husband for an assault committed during the marriage.
18. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458 (1871); Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala.
143 (1871); State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 453 (1874); Gorman v. State, 42 Tex. 221 (1875).
19. THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 192; D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 6.
20. D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 6; Waits, supra note 3, at 268 n.2. Pizzey wrote an early
and well-known book on the subject of battering, E. PizzzY, SCRKAM QUIETLY OR THE NEIGH-
BORS WILL HEAR (1974).
21. THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 192.
22. S. SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 1-2, 53-58 (1982); D. MARTIN, supra note
2, at 7.
23. See D. MARTIN, supra note 2.
24. See THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4.
25. See id. at 21-23; Moore, supra note 2, at 15-16.
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may be overrepresented in police, hospital, and social service records, but
this imbalance is due to a lack of alternative support services and re-
sources for the poor. A battered middle class woman has the option of
going to a private physician or counselor.26 Researchers, however, have
some general conclusions about the characteristics of the abuser and the
victim.
Generally authorities agree that, except in a very rare case, the spouse
abuser is not a psychopath-he knows what he is doing.2' As a group,
batterers have low self-esteem28 and have a traditional or conservative
view of male and female roles in society and in the family structure.2 '
Studies have found that a very high percentage of men who abuse their
wives were either themselves abused, or, as children, witnessed the abuse
of their mothers.8 The role of alcohol in the spousal abuse relationship
is not clear, but some studies show a link between alcohol problems
and battering.31 A batterer tends to exhibit pathologically jealous
26. Moore, supra note 2, at 15-16. D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 15-16, points out that
middle class society-the media, authors, therapists and social scientists in-
cluded-deliberately avoid acknowledging violence in the family. Id.
27. THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 26; Moore supra note 4, at 15; Straus, supra
note 4, at 194-95. Some studies, however, have attempted a connection between abusive
behavior and various idiosyncratic factors. See, e.g., Schauss, Effects of Environmental and
Nutritional Factors on Potential and Actual Batterers, in THE ABUSIVE PARTNER ANALYSIS
OF DOMESTIC BATTERING 76-90 (M. Roy ed. 1982); Elliott, The Neurology of Explosive Rage:
The Dyscontrol Syndrome in BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE 98-109 (M. Roy ed. 1977).
28. THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 36; Moore, supra note 4, at 15.
29. THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 36; Moore, supra note 4, at 15. Some au-
thors indicate that such a traditional man is more likely to be threatened and then subse-
quently beat his spouse if she earns more money than he does, or if she has more status in
society. Moore, supra note 4, at 17; Prescott & Letko, Battered Women: A Sociopsychologi-
cal Perspective, in BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 72,
74-76 (M. Roy ed. 1977) (hereinafter Prescott].
30. Lenore Walker, in a study of over 400 battered women, found that battering was
present in 80% of the batterer's homes. THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 9, at
149. Maria Roy, in a study of 4000 cases, found that 80% of the abusers had experienced
childhood abuse or witnessed the abuse of their mothers. Roy, Four Thousand Partners in
Violence: A Trend Analysis, in THE ABUSIVE PARTNER: AN ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC BAT-
TERING, 17, 34 (M. Roy ed. 1982). See also Fitch & Papatonio, Men Who Batter: Some
Pertinent Characteristics, 171 J. oF NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 190, 191 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Fitch], (71% of sample saw or heard violence between parents, 49% were themselves
abused).
31. For example, in Lenore Walker's recent study, 67% of the batterers abused alcohol,
but not always during the battering incidents. On the other hand, the alcohol abusers in-
flicted more serious injuries on women. THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 9, at
150. Maria Roy found a 35% rate of alcohol abuse among the batterers in her study. Roy,
supra note 30, at 35. A wide variety of studies are cited in Powers & Kutash, Alcohol, Drugs
and Partner Abuse, in THE ABUSIVE PARTNER: AN ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC BATTERING 39, 39-
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behavior,"' often accusing his wife of sexual affairs or by attempting to
restrict her activity so severely that infidelity would be impossible s.3  Fi-
nally, an important characteristic of the abusive spouse is his refusal to
take responsibility for his actions. He tends to put the blame on his vic-
tim, claiming that she provoked him in some way."
The woman involved in an abusive relationship resembles her partner
in that she is likely to suffer from low self-esteem and to have a tradi-
tional view of male-female roles in society. 8 Otherwise, as previously in-
dicated, any woman can be a battered woman.
The Dynamics of the Relationship. A few common themes emerge
when the causes of marital violence are examined. Many authors point
out that societal and cultural perspectives of women and marriage have,
at least historically, made a "marriage license a hitting license."3 Other
commentators point to sex role socialization generally. Traditionally, our
society expects men to be strong and aggressive and women to be weak
40, 42 (M. Roy ed. 1982). The percentage estimates for alcohol abuse among batterers range
from 53% to 87%. Alcohol use, however, also may be viewed by both parties to a battering
relationship as an excuse for the behavior. Of course, not all alcoholics beat their wives. See,
e.g., THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 25; Moore, supra note 4, at 18-19.
32. This extreme jealousy is frequently mentioned in the literature, A. BROWNE, supra
note 8, at 44; THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 9, at 149; R. DOBASH, supra,
note 6, at 98, 99; THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 37-38; Moore, supra note 2, at 16.
This jealousy is documented in the cases as well. See, e.g., State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247,
719 P.2d 1268 (1986); People v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1984); People v.
Bush, 84 Cal. App. 3d 294, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1978).
33. Walker details this sexual jealousy in her chapter on sexual abuse. THE BATTERED
WOMAN, supra note 4, at 114-17. See also R. DOBASH, supra note 6, at 98-99. In one case, the
man glued the trailer door shut when he was gone, so that the woman could not leave or
have visitors. People v. Emick, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
34. Adams & McCormick, Men Unlearning Violence: A Group Approach Based On The
Collective Model, in THE ABUSIVE PARTNER: AN ANALYSIS OF DoMESTic BATTERING 170, 178
(M. Roy ed. 1982). Authorities also indicate that not only do these men blame their wives
for their behavior, but the wives accept the blame. THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at
31, 36; R. DOASH, supra note 6, at 96.
35. THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 34; Moore, supra note 4, at 20. Walker
found in a subsequent study, however, that the women did not perceive themselves as hav-
ing low self-esteem and that they had a fairly liberal view of women's roles in society. THE
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 9, at 148, 151.
36. Straus, supra note 4, at 195-97. Straus also cites some frequently used jokes and the
ditty:
A woman, a horse, and a hickery tree
The more you beat 'em the better they be
as evidence of societal acceptance of marital violence. Id. Del Martin presents marriage and
the laws governing the marital relationship as a severe detriment to a woman in all areas:
legal, financial, sexual, even mental and physical health. Martin, What Keeps a Woman
Captive in a Violent Relationship? The Social Context of Battering, in BATTERED WOMEN
33, 42-46 (D. Moore ed. 1979).
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and passive." This expectation carries over into the marriage relationship
and affects the way law enforcement officials, friends, family, counselors,
and even the parties themselves view battering. Violence in the family
can also be seen as a means of getting and keeping power or control. The
perpetrator resorts to violence because of his self-perceived lack of
power.38 Finally, the 'subculture of violence' in our society is widely con-
demned but listed as a major contributor to family violence.3s Violence in
the media, guns in the home,'40 pornography, 41 and physical punishment
of children'2 exemplify our overall tolerance for violence.
More specific and direct causation factors are perhaps more useful for
the purposes of this article. Traditionally, therapists, law enforcement of-
ficials, and others dealing with violence in the home blamed the woman
for the man's battering. They reasoned that she must have provoked him
in some way.4' This theory, however, has been discredited." In some
cases attacks begin when the woman challenges or defies her abuser, but
this is by no means universal." Some writers connect economic factors
with battering behavior. Battering may increase during times of financial
hardship or when a man is dissatisfied with his job or level of career suc-
cess.' This theory is also disputed.' 7 Battered women claim that they fre-
37. Wardell, Gillespie & Leffler, Science and Violence Against Wives, in THE DARK SIDE
OF FAMILIES 69, 72-73 (1983) [hereinafter Wardell]. This Article, however, criticizes the so-
cialization approach. See also Couch, Research on Wife Abuse: A Scan of the Literature, in
ABUSE OF WOMEN: LEGISLATION, REPORTING AND PREVENTION 1, 4-5 (J. Costa ed. 1983)
(Couch also criticizes this approach); Martin, supra note 36, at 41-42. But see Straus, supra
note 4, at 195. (Straus would attribute very few wifebeatings to cultural factors).
38. Finkelhor, Common Features of Family Abuse, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES 17,
18-19 (1983).
39. Murray Straus, a leading author in the area of family violence, is particularly con-
cerned about society's encouragement of violence generally. Straus, Ordinary Violence,
Child Abuse and Wifebeating: What Do They Have in Common?, in THE DARK SIDE OF
FAMILIES 213, 229-33 (1983) [hereinafter Ordinary Violence]; R. DOBASH, supra note 6, at
21-23; Straus, supra note 4, at 199-200.
40. Straus, supra note 4, at 200-02.
41. Patai, Pornography and Woman Battering: Dynamic Similarities, in THE ABUSIVE
PARTNER AN ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC BATTERING 91, 91-99 (M. Roy ed. 1982); THE BATTERED
WOMAN, supra note 4, at 126.
42. THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 9, at 37; Ordinary Violence, supra
note 39, at 232; Straus, supra note 4, at 202-03.
43. Provocation was an extremely popular theory. Wardell, supra note 37, at 73-75;
Couch, supra note 37, at 4; S. SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 20-24; R. DOBASH, supra note 6,
at 102-03; D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 49.
44. See, e.g., Wardell, supra note 37, at 74-75; R. DosAsH, supra note 6, at 134-37.
45. R. DORASH, supra note 6, at 100-03. Of course, this challenge does not excuse a beat-
ing in any event. Wives, however, may deliberately provoke a beating in order to get it over
with. THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 60.
46. See Roy, supra note 30, at 31, 33; Prescott, supra note 29, at 88-89.
47. See THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 9, at 148 (85% of men involved in
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quently are beaten while pregnant. Authorities believe that a batterer,
who is usually insecure and very dependent on his wife, feels threatened
by or is jealous of the pending arrival of a child.48 In any event, there is
no clear-cut cause for battering. Just as the batterer himself is hard to
classify, the reasons for his behavior are difficult to delineate."
Similarly, the reasons why the battered woman remains in her tor-
mented situation provoke theories but defy analysis." Commentators
have mentioned that some women blame themselves for their partner's
abusive behavior, feel they deserve it, or consider it to be his "right." 1
Most women, however, have other reasons for staying with a batterer. Fi-
nancial dependence is considered a major factor, particularly when the
parties have children.52 A woman may fear that if she leaves her children
with the batterer, she will be accused of desertion and eventually will lose
custody of the children. 8 Moreover, studies have shown a high correlation
between spouse abuse and child abuse." Some women may be concerned
about the social stigma of a divorce" or may feel too humiliated to tell
anyone about their situation." Many women hope that the batterer will
mend his ways and stop the beatings (since he frequently promises to do
so).' Women stay with men who abuse them for a myriad of reasons, but
the study were employed); Fitch, supra note 30, at 190-91; Straus, supra note 4, at 196.
48. THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 9, at 149; Roy, supra note 30, at 33; J.
FLEMING, supra note 2, at 272.
49. Authors make this point in a variety of ways. Wardell, supra note 37, at 72-77 dis-
cusses and rejects several theories of wife abuse, arguing that the traditional theories are
permeated with sexist notions that limit their usefulness. Id. A similar approach is taken in
Couch, supra note 37, at 4-6. Ordinary Violence, supra note 39, at 229-30 shows a graph of
26 factors affecting wife abuse.
50. Also, as R. Dobash & R. Dobash point out, the battered woman frequently does
leave, but with varying intentions about the permanency of her act. R. DOBASH, supra note
6, at 144.
51. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
52. See S. SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 55-56; Moore, supra note 2, at 20-22; Roy, A
Current Survey of 150 Cases, in BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE 25, 31 (M. Roy ed. 1977); D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 83-84. In THE BATTERED
WOMAN, supra note 4, at 127-44, the author presents economic deprivation as a form of
spouse abuse. She also illustrates how some women would leave their abusers when they
saved up enough money to do so. Accord, J. FLEMING, supra note 2, at 84.
53. See A. BROWNE, supra note 8, at 111-13; THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra
note 9, at 146-46; LEGAL RIGHTS OF BATTERED WOMAN, Handbook published by La Casa De
Las Madres in San Francisco, reprinted in BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 2; E. PIZZEY, supra
note 20, at 122-26.
54. See A. BROWNE, supra note 8, at 94; THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 9,
at 149; J. FLEMING, supra note 2, at 272-73; D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 22-24.
55. See Moore, supra note 2, at 23; D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 81.
56. See Moore, supra note 2, at 24; D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 82-83.
57. Geller, Conjoint Therapy: Staff Training and Treatment of the Abuser and the
Abused, in THE ABUSIVE PARTNER: AN ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC BATTERING 198, 198-99 (M.
552 [Vol. 39
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a major factor (surprisingly) is that many of these women love their men,
are loyal to them, and believe that their spouses need them. s
Lenore Walker's cycle theory of violence, which is a well-known expla-
nation of the battering relationship, supports this last theory.5 ' According
to Walker, the parties continuously go through a cycle consisting of three
phases. The first is called the tension-building phase and is characterized
by minor battering incidents which gradually escalate over time." The
wife remains passive, yet attempts to control or limit the batterer's abu-
sive behavior. To a certain extent, she can succeed during this phase."
This period is usually the longest in the cycle." The second and shortest
phase is the acute battering incident." This is a serious, severe beating
characterized by the batterer's lack of control during the beating and the
lack of predictability about when it will occur." The last phase is the
'reward' phase, consisting of kindness and contrite loving behavior. The
batterer is apologetic, generous, and kind during this phase." The woman
usually wants to believe her man responds to her." Walker later found
that many couples did go through this cycle, but that this third phase
tended to become shorter and the first phase longer over the course of the
relationship. 7
Two other psychological theories are thought to play a role in the dy-
namics of a violent relationship. The first, intermittent reinforcement,
posits that when a certain behavior is reinforced at irregular intervals, it
Roy ed. 1982). See Moore, supra note 2, at 23; Roy, supra note 30, at 32; D. MARTIN, supra
note 2, at 79. In fact, this promise of reform is part of the whole basis of the Walker Cycle
theory of violence, discussed infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
58. A. BROWNE, supra note 8, at 141-42. A recent study of women who killed their abus-
ing spouse found that shock, horror, and grief filled many of the women when they realized
their husband was dead. Id. See THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 67-69; Moore,
supra note 2, at 23; D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 82.
59. The cycle of theory of violence is presented in THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4,
at 55-70.
60. Id. at 56-59.
61. Id. at 56. Walker states that this passivity is combined with rationalizations for the
abusive behavior, denial of the seriousness of the situation, and anger. Id. at 56-57.
62. Id. at 58. Walker gives an example of a 10-year tension-building phase. Id.
63. Id. at 60. Walker indicates that the duration usually ranges from two to twenty-four
hours. Id.
64. Id. at 59-61.
65. Id. at 65-66. The man may present his wife with expensive gifts, apologize profusely,
and promise that the battering will cease. Id. This general pattern of violence, particularly
the contrition phase, was also documented in A. BROWNE, supra note 8, at 62-65.
66. THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 66-69. Walker notes that this is the time
that battered women will often leave their abusers, and yet they are still vulnerable to these
manipulations, much to the frustration of police, counselors and friends. Id.
67. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome Study, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES 31,
43-44 (1983).
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becomes very difficult to stop or to modify."" Similarly, abusive men are
not constantly abusive; their relationships with their families usually have
some happy periods. This makes it difficult for a woman to leave her
abuser. Second, psychologists have discovered a phenomenon known as
learned helplessness. If animals (or humans) continuously experience sit-
uations in which they have no control over outcomes, the experience im-
pairs their ability to respond in a situation in which they could have some
control.6s Some believe that at least a few battered women lose their abil-
ity to 'save' themselves because they feel they have no control over the
battering situation. One author compared battered women to prisoners of
war or other victims of severe physical and emotional trauma. They suffer
from shock and denial and are unable to realistically assess their danger.
They may become passive, withdrawn, and may fail to take advantage of
escape opportunities when presented. 0
Finally, there is the important element of fear. Many women fear that
if they do leave, their abuser will track them down and beat them even
more severely or possibly kill them.'1 A batterer is often afraid that his
wife will leave him, so he makes ugly threats against her, her children, or
her family in an effort to frighten her into staying.'2 On a more basic
68. See Geller, supra note 57, at 199.
69. THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 42-54. Walker discusses some interesting
animal studies involving the learned helplessness phenomenon. For example, when dogs re-
ceived electrical shocks at random, varied intervals, the dogs found that they could not con-
trol the pain. In order to retrain the dogs to voluntarily avoid the shocks, the researchers
had to drag the dogs out of their cages repeatedly until they learned to escape on their own.
Id. at 46. In another experiment, researchers held baby rats in their hands until all escape
movements ceased then the researchers released them. They repeated the procedure several
times. Then they placed the rats in a vat of water. The "treated" rats drowned within 30
minutes. However, "untreated" rats could swim up to 60 hours before they drowned. Id. at
46-47. But see Wardell, supra note 37, at 76-77 (rejecting the theory).
70. A. BROWNE, supra note 8, at 122-27.
71. In her recent study of battered women who killed their abusers, Angela Browne
found that fear was a reaction experienced by several of the women immediately after the
death. They could not believe that their attacker was dead and they continued to attempt to
'hide' from him. A. BROWNE, supra note 8, at 141. Angela Browne estimates that as many as
50% of abused women who leave their spouses are later followed, harassed, and attacked by
their spouses. Id. at 110. In some cases in which women have killed their abusers, the death
occurred after the man had tracked 'his' woman down after she had left him. See State v.
Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 693 P.2d 475 (1985); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312
(1984). See also S. SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 19 (woman confronts fear of retaliation,
and may be advised to hide out); Moore, supra note 2, at 22 (husbands frequently will track
down and terrorize wives); D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 76-79 (examples of women whose
spouses stalked them, sometimes for years).
72. See A. BROWNE, supra note 8, at 65; THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 9,
at 42-43; State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d at 477; People v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 481 N.Y.S.2d
552, 558 (1984).
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level, a battered woman is simply afraid of the unknown-the outside
world. She is concerned about supporting herself and her children; she
worries about leaving the security (such as it is) of her present life style."
The Nature of the Abuse. Abuse of women by their male partners
takes a variety of forms. Of course, the most serious form of battering is
physical abuse, which can range from the fairly minor (slapping, pushing,
shoving) to the very serious (punching, kicking, choking, throwing, use of
objects to beat, or use of weapons)." ' Most abusers do not use weapons;
they use their hands, fists, or feet to physically assault their wives. 5
Bruises are the most commonly reported injuries,7" but broken bones and
other severe injuries are far from rare.7
A related form of physical battering is sexual abuse. The examples of
this form of abuse range from marital rape, or sodomy, to forced sex with
objects, animals, or third parties.78 This form of abuse is particularly dev-
astating within the context of the battering relationship since many
women report that sexual relations with their partners can also be nor-
mal, happy, and good.7'
Physical battering is often combined with other forms of abusive be-
havior. Women frequently cite economic deprivation in battering rela-
73. S. SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 19; Moore, supra note 2, at 22; R. DOBASH, supra
note 6, at 146-47.
74. See Roy, supra note 30, at 27 (physical abuse present in 60.8% of the cases); THE
BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 79 (summary of major and minor forms of physical
abuse); R. DOBASH, supra, note 6, at 106-07 (descriptions of various forms of physical vio-
lence from several studies). The variety of forms of abuse is without limit. In State v. Hun-
dley, 693 P.2d at 476, the husband would dilute his diabetic wife's insulin with water. Id.
75. Roy, supra note 30, at 27, 34; R. DOBASH, supra note 6, at 248 (Table 7). In fact, one
author indicates that abusive men may aim their blows at places on the woman's body
where injuries will not show: the torso, or the top of the head. D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at
49.
76. See Roy, supra note 30, at 27, (49.8% of injuries are bruises); R. DOBASH, supra note
6, at 248 (Table 8) (70% of injuries are bruises).
77. See, e.g., M. SCHULMAN, A SURVEy OF SPOUSAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN KEN-
TUCKY 1 (1981), cited in Waits, supra note 3, at 274 (five to ten percent of abused women do
report severe abuse or use of a weapon); Roy, supra note 30, at 27 (9% broken limbs); THE
BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 79-80 (broken ribs and arms, caused by the woman
raising her arms to defend herself, are the most common broken bones, other serious inju-
ries cited); R. DOBASH, supra note 6, at 248 (Table 8) (other injuries include cuts, burns,
broken bones, internal injuries and being knocked unconscious).
78. Walker and Browne found that marital rape was fairly common in abusive relation-
ships. THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 9, at 149; A. BROWNE, supra note 8, at
95-103. See also S. SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 17. But see Roy, supra note 30, at 27 (only
2.2% of assaults were sexual abuse). In Walker's chapter on sexual abuse in her first book,
Walker discusses some of the forced perverse sexual practices. THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra
note 4, at 118-24.
79. THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 108-13.
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tionships. The husband will not give his wife any money without her 'jus-
tifying' it, or he will direct her to pay the bills and run the household
without giving her adequate funds to do so. This form of abuse goes be-
yond mere economic dependence into a more sinister means of control by
a man over his woman.80 Verbal battering, such as name calling or criti-
cal, derogatory remarks and comments designed to humiliate a woman,
can shatter her sense of self-worth as well as become a source of great
anger for her. 1 Deliberate social isolation is another coercive technique
batterers employ. This can range from outright selection of a woman's
friends, 2 locking her up in the house, making sure she never goes out
alone, 3 to more subtle manipulative behavior. For example, some men
will refuse to escort their wives to social or family events, or if they do go,
they may pick a fight or begin verbal abuse of their wives or of other
people present.6 " Of course, it is important to note that the coercive
power of the economic deprivation, verbal abuse, or social isolation comes
from both parties' knowledge that if the woman does not passively accept
much of this behavior, the man is likely to explode and physically assault
her. 5
C. The Legal System's Response to Battering
The criminal justice system's response (or lack thereof) to the predica-
ment of the battered woman is, as one author puts it, merely a reflection
of the views of society. 6 If society accepts wife beating as normal or per-
missible behavior, nothing will be done to stop it. When society's attitude
changes, the criminal justice system will also change.
Traditional Responses. The police are the most important link to
the legal system for the battered woman. One author aptly calls police the
80. See id. at 127-44; R. DOBASH, supra note at 6, at 128-29.
81. See S. SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 17; THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 172-
74.
82. A batterer may also try to isolate his wife from her family. See Waits, supra note 3,
at 287; THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 169; R. DOBASH, supra note 6, at 132. These
attempts at isolation are also often attributed to the abuser's extreme jealousy. See supra
notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., A. BROWNE, supra note 8, at 43; R. DOBASH, supra note 6, at 129-31; D.
MARTIN, supra note 2, at 83-84.
84. See THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 169-72; R. DOBASH, supra note 6, at 114-
15.
85. See S. SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 17; THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 166-
67.
86. Paterson, How the Legal System Responds to Battered Women, in BATTERED
WOMEN 79, 80 (D. Moore ed. 1979).
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'gatekeepers' of the system.87 The police are available twenty-four hours a
day, are usually a battered woman's first contact with the legal system,
and the very act of calling them is often a battered woman's desperate cry
for help."
Traditionally, the police were ineffective (or worse) in their response to
domestic violence calls. For example, one widely-cited 1976 study from
Kansas City, Missouri, indicated that ninety percent of the city's family
homicides were preceded by at least one call to the police, while five or
more calls preceded fifty percent of the cases."9 Police are reluctant to
deal with a battering situation for a variety of reasons. First, domestic
disputes are dangerous for officers to handle. Studies show that between
twenty and thirty-three percent of police officer assaults or homicides oc-
cur when officers respond to domestic disturbance calls.'* Second, the of-
ficers may have certain attitudes or beliefs about domestic violence that
are reinforced through their training programs.9' Many people (including
police officers) believe some of the outdated myths about the battered
woman, for example, that she enjoys being beaten, that she provoked the
beatings,92 or that a husband has the intrinsic right to slap his wife
87. CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 29.
88. See id.; Martin, supra note 36, at 48.
89. See Moore, supra note 2, at 13.
90. Several studies are cited in Stephens, Domestic Assault: The Police Response, in
BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 164 (M. Roy ed. 1977)
and in J. FLEMING, supra note 2, at 173.
91. E.g. in S. SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 157, a widely reported Michigan Police
Training Academy procedure is presented:
a. Avoid arrest if possible. Appeal to their vanity.
b. Explain the procedure of obtaining a warrant.
1. Complainant must sign complaint.
2. Must appear in court.
3. Consider loss of time.
4. Cost of court.
c. State that your only interest is to prevent a breach of the peace.
d. Explain that attitudes usually change by court time.
e. Recommend a postponement.
1. Court not in session.
2. No judge available.
f. Don't be too harsh or critical.
D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 93-99 cites an explicit nonarrest policy from the Oakland, Cali-
fornia police department: "Normally, officers should adhere to the policy that arrests shall
be avoided except as necessary to (1) preserve life and property and (2) preserve the peace."
The manual goes on to advise the officer to discourage a party demanding an arrest and to
encourage the parties to reason with each other. See also J. FLEMING, supra note 2, at 174,
in which a widely used training guide urges the officer to "act on his instinct" in assessing a
domestic incident. Id.
92. See THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 20, 29. See also supra notes 43-45 and
accompanying text.
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around if she gets out of line."' Tales abound too of an extremely strong
and somewhat puzzling concern on the part of police officers for the bat-
terer. Officers worry that the batterer will get into trouble or 'lose face' if
he is arrested. This phenomenon may be attributable to sexist attitudes
combined with a belief in the myths about battered women as well as a
concern for family privacy." Third, until recently many police depart-
ments encouraged their officers to mediate domestic disputes but not to
arrest a batterer."s Fourth, past legislation supporting police action was
ineffective. For example, temporary restraining orders were often only
available to women who were already in the process of getting a divorce.
Moreover, officers could not make an arrest unless a felony was commit-
ted or unless the officers actually witnessed a misdemeanor.' Finally,
even when the police did act, prosecutors and judges often failed to follow
through with vigorous prosecution and appropriate punishment of the
offender.
The criminal justice system has stubbornly refused to recognize wife
abuse as a crime.'7 Generally, prosecutors and judges also believe the
myths that surround the battered woman. Thus, prosecutors are reluctant
to pursue spousal abuse cases since they often present evidentiary
problems,es the victim may change her mind," and even if the case does
come to trial, there is little chance of a conviction or a serious sanction
against the offender. 100 Both district attorneys and judges may urge the
93. An often cited statistic comes from a Harris poll, in which 20% of the Americans
surveyed approved of hitting one's spouse on 'appropriate' occasions. Stephens, supra note
90, at 164. In BEHIND CLOSED DooRs, supra note 4, at 47, the authors found that 28% of the
men and over 23% of the women in their study thought that slapping a spouse around was
'normal' behavior.
94. S. SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 158-59; THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at
207; Paterson, supra note 86, at 85; D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 96-97, 101.
95. See, e.g., Paterson, supra note 86, at 82; J. FLEMING, supra note 2, at 175. And
generally, supra note 91.
96. S. SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 159; Paterson, supra note 86, at 83-84; D. MAWIN,
supra note 2, at 90.
97. CONFRONTING DoMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 55; Paterson, supra note 86, at
94-95; D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 117.
98. Frequently in a battering situation, which is an intra-family crime, no witnesses
exist (except perhaps children); neither do police reports nor medical reports documenting
the injuries. CONFRONTNG DoMESTic VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 55; THE BATTERED WOMAN,
supra note 4, at 213.
99. Victim ambivalence is a frequently mentioned concern. See CONFRONTING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 55; R. DOBASI, supra note 6, at 221. Others, however, argue that
battered women would follow through more willingly in these cases if they had a better
support system in the first place. Waits, supra note 3, at 318; THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra
note 4, at 213; Paterson, supra note 86, at 94.
100. CONFRONTING DoMEsTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 55; S. SCHECHTER, supra note
22, at 163; R, DOBASH, supra note 6, at 220; Paterson, supra note 86, at 94. See generally
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parties to reconcile0 1 or may purposely induce delays in an effort to get
the parties to 'cool off." In the event a woman does pursue her claim
through the minefield of legal obstacles, the system then may, in effect,
put her on trial in an attempt to show that she deserved or provoked the
abuse.108
Changes in the Legal System. Numerous reform proposals have
been presented in recent years, and some have actually been imple-
mented. A number of reforms affect the participants in the criminal jus-
tice system itself. A common change is improved education and training
for police officers, prosecutors, and judges about the complexities of a
battering situation.1" Other reforms are more specific. For example, some
police departments have standardized procedures for dealing with a bat-
tering situation.'" s Other police departments have placed an increased
emphasis on arresting the batterer,'" enforcing protection orders, pro-
tecting the victim,1'7 or improving reporting and data collection.1 " Prose-
cutors may adopt a 'no drop' policy for domestic abuse cases0 9 or set up
special units in the office specifically designed to deal with domestic vio-
lence cases. 1 0
Legislators have enacted changes geared toward helping the battered
woman: "enforcing the victim's rights, increasing her legal options, and
protecting her from further assaults.""' The area of victim support has
Crites, A Judicial Guide to Understanding Wife Abuse, THE JUDGES' J., Summer 1985, at 5.
The author cites judicial gender bias, ignorance about the psychosocial nature of battering,
and the lack of awareness of the seriousness of the crime as reasons for ineffective judicial
response to spouse abuse. Id. at 7.
101. S. SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 162; D. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 115-16.
102. S. SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 163; R. DOBASH, supra note 6, at 218; D. MARTIN,
supra note 2, at 113.
103. R. DOBASH, supra note 6, at 218-19.
104. CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 81-82; Blair, Making the Legal
System Work For Battered Women in BA'rERD WOMEN 101, 115 (D. Moore ed. 1979).
105. CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 30-31. This reform goes hand in
hand with the concept of retraining police officers. See S. SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 161;
Stephens, supra note 90, at 170.
106. CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 29, 32-40; Waits, supra note 3,
at 309-10, 316-19; S. SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 159.
107. CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 40-43; S. SCHECHTER, supra note
22, at 159.
108. CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 43-44; Waits, supra note 3, at
319.
109. Many prosecutors also will subpoena the victims if they will not testify voluntarily.
CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 73-74; Waits, supra note 3, at 322-23.
110. CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 56-58; Paterson, supra note 86,
at 94.
111. S. SCHECHTER, supra note 22, at 159. Schechter discusses several specific legislative
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elicited a number of suggested reforms, but these reforms seldom are put
into action. A battered woman often needs money, an attorney, a place to
go, education or job training, and emotional support through what can be
a very difficult period.11 The legal system is changing, and perhaps these
reforms will improve the lot of the battered woman. The key to the prob-
lem, however, is not in the legal system, but in the interaction between
the batterer, the victim, and society itself.
III. THE BATTERED WOMAN AND THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
A. Introduction
In the past, when a battered woman killed or seriously injured her
abuser, she frequently would plead mental impairment or insanity as a
defense to a criminal charge.13 This defense, however, often resulted in
involuntary commitment to a mental institution.11' In the last decade,
many battered women instead have presented a claim of self-defense
when charged with the murder or manslaughter of their abusing husband
or boyfriend.115 Attempts to use the law of self-defense in the battered
enactments. Id. at 159-69. See also Lerman, Landis & Goldzweig, State Legislation on Do-
mestic Violence, in ABUSE OF WOMEN: LEGISLATION, REPORTING AND PREVENTION 39-47 (J.
Costa ed. 1983); Comment, The Battered Women's Syndrome Defense, 34 KAN. L. REV. 337,
364-65 (1985). Post arrest restriction of the batterer can be a key element in preserving the
victim's safety. See Waits, supra note 3, at 320-21.
112. CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 68-73; S. SCHECHTER, supra note
22, at 165-66; Blair, supra note 104, at 112-13; Stephens, supra note 90, at 171.
113. See Schneider, supra note 7, at 630; Schneider & Jordan, Representation of
Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, in WOMEN'S
SELF DEFENSE CASES 1, 5 (E. Bochnak ed. 1981); Comment, Self Defense: Battered Women
Syndrome on Trial, 20 CAL. W. L. REV. 485, 496-97 (1984).
114. Schneider & Jordan, supra note 113, at 29. Angela Browne points out some other
problems with the use of an insanity or impaired mental state defense. For example, since
jurors are extremely suspicious of such claims, the defense must work even harder to estab-
lish credibility. A. BRowNE, supra note 8, at 176. See also State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 716
P.2d 563, 569-70 (1986) (discussing the inherent difference between a claim of self-defense
and insanity plea).
115. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grove, 526 A.2d 369 (Pa. Super. 1987); State v. Hodges,
239 Kan. 63, 716 P.2d 563 (1986); State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 719 P.2d 1268 (1986);
Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461,
693 P.2d 475 (1985); People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1985); Fielder v.
State, 683 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. CL App. 1985); State v. Nunn, 356 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa Ct. App.
1984); State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478
A.2d 364 (1984); People v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1984); State v. Allery,
101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983);
State v. Thomas, 13 Ohio App. 3d 211, 468 N.E.2d 763 (1983); State v. Leaphart, 673
S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); Fultz v. State, 439 N.E.2d 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982);
Commonwealth v. Zenyuh, 307 Pa. Super. 253, 453 A.2d 338 (1982); Smith v. State, 247 Ga.
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woman's situation, however, have been fraught with legal difficulties. One
issue is the use of expert testimony to explain the battered woman syn-
drome, as discussed in part IV below. The traditional elements of self-
defense can present an array of complex and controversial legal hurdles
for a battered woman charged with homicide. This section will discuss
these problems and pose some solutions.
B. Women and Violent Crime
Sociological scholarship largely ignored the female criminal until the
mid- to late 1800s.116 Early theories of female criminality held that
women who committed crimes of any sort were biologically or genetically
defective 1 7 or were maladjusted and in rebellion against their 'natural'
feminine roles.118 These theories persist even in modem literature."' For
example, these beliefs often led to unequal treatment of female offenders
in sentencing. Women may be sentenced to longer prison terms than men
to 'cure' or rehabilitate these 'sick' and deviant members of the female
sex.120
The notion of a violent female may particularly threaten society since
violence is antithetical to traditional concepts of 'feminine.""1 As one au-
thority aptly noted, the criminal law and society will more readily excuse
a man for killing his wife's paramour than excuse a woman for killing her
rapist.1 2 1 Women, however, do commit crimes, violent and otherwise. In
612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); People v. White, 90 Ill.
App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196 (1980). See also cases cited in Schneider & Jordan, supra note
113, at 2-3 n.3.
116. The first work published on the subject was C. LOMBROSO, THE FEMALE OFFENDER
(1895). Lombroso focused on physical characteristics of the criminal classes, attempting to
distinguish the deviant from the normal. See Bower, Statistics and Theory on Female
Crime, in WOMEN AND CRIME IN AMERICA 2 (L. Bower ed. 1981); F. ADLER, SISTERS IN CRIME
31-33 (1975).
117. See generally supra note 116.
118. The rebellion against a 'natural' feminine role is based on Freudian theory. See
Bower, supra note 116, at 2; R SIMON, WOMEN AND CRIME 3-5 (1975).
119. See, e.g., sources discussed in Smart, Criminological Theory: Its Ideology and Im-
plications Concerning Women, in WOMEN AND CRIME IN AMERICA 6, 8-13 (L. Bower ed.
1981); R. SIMON, supra note 118, at 7-9.
120. See Smart, supra note 119, at 13-16; Temin, Discriminatory Sentencing of Women
Offenders: The Argument for ERA in a Nutshell, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 355, 358 (1973). See
also A. BROWNE, supra note 8, at 10-11; accord Schneider & Jordan, supra note 113, at 7
(courts are more likely to find women guilty of more serious offenses than men and to sen-
tence women to longer prison terms).
121. A. BROWNE, supra note 8, at 176 (women who commit violent acts are seen as more
deranged than males who commit similar crimes); Schneider & Jordan, supra note 113, at 6
(women criminals are more intrinsically wicked than men); Schneider, supra note 7, at 629.
122. Schneider & Jordan, supra note 113, at 14-15.
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fact, the rate of crimes perpetrated by females appears to be increasing.
1 2 3
Many authorities attempted to tie the increase in female crimes to the
movement for women's liberation.12 It appears that although the rate of
property crimes committed by women has increased, the rate of violent
crimes has remained stable."' 5
A great number of women who commit crimes, including homicide, are
the victims of battering. In one study, Lenore Walker found that many
female inmates were battered women whose criminal activity occurred at
the insistence of their abusive partner. They would steal, for example, in
order to avoid a beating."' In 1979, it was estimated that women who
killed their 'mates' in self-defense committed 4.8% of all murders.127 In
1982, it was estimated that wives killed husbands in 3.4% of all
murders.1 21 In one survey of female prisoners in Cook County, forty per-
cent of the offenders were accused of killing a male batterer 1 2 9
Women do kill men, but these women often claim that they did so only
as a last resort in the face of a life-threatening battering situation.1 30 Liv-
ing with an abusive man is dangerous for a woman.1 3 1 Although research-
ers have isolated certain factors that influence the lethal potential of the
123. See Steffensmeier, Crime and the Contemporary Woman: An Analysis of Changing
Levels of Female Property Crime 1960-1975, in WOMEN AND CRIME IN AMERICA 39, 51 (L.
Bower ed. 1981); Simon, American Women and Crime, in WOMEN AND CRIME IN AMERICA 37
(L. Bower ed. 1981); F. ADLER, supra note 116, at 15.
124. Freda Adler was one of the first authors to propose the connection, arguing that
with increased female participation in formerly male activities generally comes increased
female participation in crime. F. ADLER, supra note 116. See also Buda & Butler, The Bat-
tered Wife Syndrome: A Backdoor Assault on Domestic Violence, 23 J. FAts L 359, 359-60
(1984); Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1982) [hereinafter Walker]. Many other authorities, however, dispute the connec-
tion, arguing that increased female violence is merely part of a larger societal trend. See
Steffensmeier, supra note 123, at 52-53; Bower, supra note 116, at 4-5.
125. Simon, supra note 123, at 37; Steffensmeier, supra note 123, at 52; F. ADLER, supra
note 116, at 16.
126. See THE BATTEED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 9, at 142.
127. See D. SONKIN, D. MARTIN & L. WALKER, THE MALE BATrERER A TREATMENT AP-
PROACH 72 (1985) [hereinafter D. SONKIN] (citing FBI statistics).
128. See U.S. DEs'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 9
(1982), cited in Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in
Self-Defense, 8 HA~v. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 121 in 3 (1985).
129. See Waits, supra note 3, at 274 n.22 (citing Defense Strategies for Battered
Women Who Assault Their Mates: State v. Curry, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 161 (1981)).
130. See A. BROWNE, supra note 8, at 145-46; THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra
note 9, at 41. See also infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
131. Walker indicates that frequency and severity of abuse, as well as the use of weapons
in battering escalates over time. THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 9, at 43-44,
150 (citing Wife Beating: The Silent Crime, TIME, Sept. 5, 1983, at 23). Estimates show that
between 2000 and 4000 women are killed each year as a result of domestic violence. See
Waits, supra note 3, at 274 n.21. See also supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
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relationship,"" most women believe that the possibility of death is ever-
present."' 8 These facts must be considered in a discussion of the self-de-
fense claims of battered women who kill.
C. The Elements of Self-Defense
Basically, a person will be justified in using a reasonable amount of
force to protect herself from an attack if she reasonably believes that: 1)
she is in immediate danger of bodily harm; 2) the force is necessary to
avoid the danger; and 3) she is not the aggressor.'8 ' There are several
legal issues, however, within this definition.
Justification and Excuse. Self-defense is usually a justification for a
crime, not merely an excuse. If the defendant can prove the elements of
self-defense, then the defendant is completely exonerated."' The com-
mon law commanded or authorized certain types of homicides. A person
who committed a justifiable homicide was acquitted because of the nature
of the murder-it was stamped with the king's seal of approval.'" On the
other hand, the common law excused, but did not justify, certain other
homicides because of some unique characteristics of the defendant.
132. See D. SONKIN, supra note 127, at 73-74 (lists such factors as threats to kill, threats
with weapons, intoxication and drug use, and frequency and severity of violence as affecting
the lethal potential); THE BArERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 9, at 39-44 (lists similar
factors, plus isolation, long-term battering history, children and excessive jealousy as "le-
thality factors"). Angela Browne found similar factors to be relevant in a recent study com-
paring relationships that resulted in the death of the batterer with nonlethal battering rela-
tionships. A. BROWNE, supra note 8, at 127-28.
In a striking number of these homicide cases, the victim-abuser was intoxicated. See, e.g.,
State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 719 P.2d 1268, 1272 (1986); State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461,
693 P.2d 475, 476 (1985); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364, 369 (1984); State v.
Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 813-14 (N.D. 1983); Borders v. State, 433 So. 2d 1325, 1326 (Fla.
Dist.,Ct. App. 1983); Commonwealth v. Zenyuh, 307 Pa. Super. 253, 453 A.2d 338, 339 (Pa.
Super. 1982); People v. White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196, 198 (1980); People v.
Bush, 84 Cal. App. 294, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430, 435 (1978).
133. Browne found that 98% of the abused women that she studied who did kill their
spouses and 90% of the women who did not kill their spouses believed that their abuser
could or would kill them. A. BROWNE, supra note 8, at 113. In Walker's study, 92% of the
women surveyed believed that their batterer could or would kill them and 87% believed
that if someone died, it would be the woman. THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note
9, at 39.
134. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 454-63 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter W.
LAFAVE]; R. PERKINS & R. BOYcE, CRIMINAL LAW 1113-16 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter R.
PERKINS].
135. See, e.g., R. PERKINS, supra note 134, at 1123-26; Crocker, supra note 128, at 130-
31; Buda & Butler, supra note 124, at 373; Schneider & Jordan, supra note 113, at 13.
136. Examples include: execution of a sentence of death, killing an enemy in battle, kill-
ing a felon to prevent escape, or to prevent a felony perpetrated by violence or surprise. R.
PERKINS, supra note 134, at 1124.
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Courts focused on the nature of the actor, not the nature of the murder
itself.1 37 Thus, unlike cases of justifiable homicide, the law still punished
a person guilty of excusable homicide.'" Modern law still embodies this
distinction. A murder charge may be reduced to the lesser charge of man-
slaughter because of some unique characteristic of the defendant, such as
state of mind. Hence, if a defendant can prove self-defense, she goes free.
If, for example, she can show only that she acted with provocation and in
the heat of the moment, she is still punished for manslaughter.139
Deadly and Nondeadly Force. Second, courts considering a claim
of self-defense will look at the amount of force that the defendant used.
The force used must be reasonable. Traditionally, many courts held that
the use of deadly force against nondeadly force was per se unreasona-
ble.140 Thus, while being beaten, kicked, or threatened with violence (but
without a weapon), a woman could not use a weapon to defend herself.
For example, deadly force was the key issue in Commonwealth v.
Zenyuh.4 In that case, the victim was beating his wife, refused to let her
leave, and came at her in a rage. She then picked up a kitchen knife and
stabbed him.142 The majority found that the defendant wife had acted in
self-defense.143 The dissent, however, stated that "more is required to jus-
tify the use of deadly force in self-defense than an enraged and abusive
perpetrator and a threat issued several years previously."1 4 4 In another
case, People v. Bush, 14 the prosecutor told the jury that the victim did
not deserve to die for "slapping a woman. ''"1  In the past, the victim had
repeatedly beaten his wife with his fists and feet and had made death
threats.147 On the day of the homicide, he choked her, beat her about the
137. Id. at 1124-26. Early examples of excusable homicide were accidental killings, kill-
ing by an insane person, and killings in certain types of self-defense (e.g. killing in self-
defense when a safe retreat was available). Id. See also Crocker, supra note 128, at 130-31.
138. At common law, the person who committed an excusable homicide forfeited his life
and his goods, although the king generally granted a pardon for the person's life.R PER-
KINS, supra note 134, at 1124.
139. See e.g. W; LAFAVE, supra note 134, at 463; R. PRKINS, supra note 134, at 1141-42;
Fultz v. State, 439 N.E.2d 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); People v. White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067,
414 N.E.2d 196 (1980); People v. Bush, 84 Cal. App. 3d 294, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1978).
140. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 134, at 456; Schneider & Jordan, supra note 113, at 17,
23; Schneider, supra note 7, at 631.
141. 307 Pa. Super. 253, 453 A.2d 338 (1982).
142. 453 A.2d at 339-40.
143. Id. at 340-41.
144. Id. at 341.
145. 84 Cal. App. 3d 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1978).
146. 148 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
147. Id. at 433-34.
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face and head, refused to let her leave, and again threatened to kill her.14
Many legal writers and courts have concluded that the deadly force
rule is arbitrary. Women are typically smaller and weaker than men.
They are not trained to use their bodies to fight or defend themselves,
nor do they learn how to take blows." The common law view of
nondeadly force presupposes two men each of approximately equal size,
weight, and strength fighting each other.150 When one of the parties to the
fight is a woman, however, the punching, hitting, and kicking can amount
to deadly force. Most women are socialized to be somewhat passive and
nonaggressive, to get along, and to keep the peace. These feminine traits
are frequently even more pronounced in the battered woman.8 1 More-
over, a battered woman may have discovered that using her own body
(i.e. fists, feet) to defend herself only makes her abuser angrier and more
violent.18 1 Thus, when evaluating self-defense claims, the modern trend is
to consider the respective size of the parties, their sex, the particularly
violent nature of the attack, and the attacker's reputation for violence or
violent history.183
Imminent Danger. The element of imminent or immediate danger is
a more fundamental problem with a battered woman's plea of self-de-
fense. In the well-known case of People v. Garcia,"8 two men raped and
beat defendant then threatened to return and assault her again. Garcia
went home, got a gun and hunted down her attackers, later finding and
killing one of them.115 The court eventually acquitted Garcia on self-de-
fense grounds.'" The case was heralded as a landmark decision affecting
a woman's right to defend herself.57 Frequently, a battered woman who
kills does so after a particularly severe or violent incident coupled with a
threat of an even more severe beating or death by her assailant. She per-
ceives that something about her attacker's behavior is 'different' this
148. Id. at 434-35.
149. See Crocker, supra note 128, at 127; Walker, supra note 124, at 7; Schneider &
Jordan, supra note 113, at 18, 22.
150. See e.g., R. PERKINS, supra note 134, at 1121, 1134; Schneider & Jordan, supra note
113, at 18, 23; Schneider, supra note 7, at 631-32.
151. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
152. See THE BATTERm WOMAN, supra note 4, at 61-62; R. DOBASH, supra note 6, at 108.
153. See W. LAFAvE, supra note 134, at 457; Crocker, supra note 128, at 132; Schneider
& Jordan, supra note 113, at 22-24; Eisenberg & Dillon, Medico-Legal Aspects of Repre-
senting the Battered Woman, 5 OKLA. CiTy U.L. REV. 645, 654-55 (1980).
154. 54 Cal. App. 3d 61, 126 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976).
155. 126 Cal. Rptr. at 281. The facts were recounted in Walker, supra note 124, at 4.
156. Garcia pleaded insanity and the court convicted her of second-degree murder at her
first trial, but the appellate court reversed the decision. 126 Cal. Rptr. at 281. She was later
acquitted, People v. Garcia, Cr. No. 4259 (Sup. Ct. Monterrey Calif. 1977).
157. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 124, at 4; Schneider & Jordan, supra note 113, at 1.
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time, and the battered woman believes he will make good on his
threats."" Thus, after he falls asleep or turns his back, she acts.
The element of immediacy was the key issue in State v. Gallegos,," in
which defendant shot the victim while he was lying on the bed.10 On the
day of the killing, the victim had sexually abused defendant, threatened
to kill her, and struck their child in the face with a belt buckle.161 The
New Mexico Court of Appeals adopted a hybrid standard for the fear of
immediate danger element of self-defense. The fact-finder must consider
defendant's perceptions of immediate threat of harm and whether a rea-
sonable person, in similar circumstances, would also act in self-defense. 112
Defendant warranted a self-defense instruction. Similarly, in State v.
Leidholm,'63 defendant stabbed her husband while he slept.'" The evi-
dence at trial revealed a long history of abuse and an abusive incident on
the night of the homicide.'" The North Dakota Supreme Court adopted a
subjective standard for self-defense: whether the accused believed that
deadly force was necessary to protect herself against imminent unlawful
harm.166 In contrast, the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to allow a
self-defense instruction when defendant shot her sleeping husband and
set his body on fire.1 67 The court excluded evidence of the husband's pat-
tern of abusive behavior and of particular violent acts.'" Because the vic-
tim was drunk and asleep at the time of the murder, the court found no
imminent danger on that "present occasion."11 In State v. Nunn,170 the
Iowa Court of Appeals held that defendant's killing of her live-in boy-
friend was not justified when the argument had ended several minutes
before the stabbing and the victim was unarmed.7 1 The court found that
defendant's fear of imminent life-threatening danger was not reasonable
159. See Bochnak, Case Preparation and Development in WOMEN'S SELF-Dx ENSa
CAsEs 41, 44-46 (E. Bochnak ed. 1981); Schneider supra note 7, at 634. See also the discus-
sion of the factors affecting the likelihood of a homicide at supra note 129 and accompany-
ing text.
159. 104 N.M. 247, 719 P.2d 1268 (1986).
160. 719 P.2d at 1269.
161. Id. at 1272.
162. Id. at 1271. See also the discussion of subjective and objective standards of reasona-
bleness at notes 194-208 infra and accompanying text.
163. 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
164. Id. at 814.
165. Id. at 813.
166. Id. at 817-18.
167. Commonwealth v. Grove, 526 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. Super. 1987).
168. Id. at 371.
169. Id. at 373.
170. 356 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).




under the circumstances,17 despite defendant's evidence of a violent rela-
tionship and the victim's threat to kill her on the day of the murder. 72 In
Fultz v. State,174 the Indiana Court of Appeals refused to allow defend-
ant's evidence of the victim's violent behavior because she had not
pleaded self-defense. 175 In Fultz, defendant shot the victim after he
pointed a finger at her and made inaudible threats. She offered to show a
history of severe abuse beginning in 1973.176 In catch-22 reasoning, the
court found that defendant had not shown the victim had committed an
aggressive act sufficient for her to form a reasonable belief that she was inimminent danger. Therefore, she had not presented a self-defense claim
and could not present evidence of his past violent acts. 177
Again, legal scholars argue that the inherent differences between men
and women should be considered. A woman will usually not be able to
defend herself during an actual attack. A battered woman is usually in a
state of learned helplessness and hopelessness. She may reasonably be-
lieve that she cannot run away, that she has nowhere to go,'78 and even if
she does leave, that her abuser will track her down and continue his tor-
menting behavior.17' The Kansas Supreme Court faced this problem in
State v. Hundley.1s0 Defendant moved out of her home after ten years of
abuse by her husband. Her husband, however, continued to harass and
threaten her.' 1 On the day of the killing, the victim broke into defend-
ant's motel room and hit, choked, and sexually assaulted her. Afterwards,
he gave her money and told her to buy him cigarettes. Defendant felt
threatened as her husband reached for a beer bottle at his side, since he
had hit her with such a weapon in the past. She shot her husband as he
reached for the bottle.112 The jury convicted her of involuntary man-
slaughter.18 3 The supreme court reversed, however, because the trial court
used the term 'immediate' danger in the jury instructions instead of the
statutory word "imminent."'" The court found that the term 'immediate'
172. Id.
173. Id. at 603.
174. 439 N.E.2d 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
175. Id. at 662.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Crocker, supra note 128, at 133-34; Buda & Butler, supra note 124, at 378. See
also supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
179. Crocker, supra note 128, at 134; THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 4, at 203; D.
MARTIN, supra note 2, at 77.
180. 236 Kan. 461, 693 P.2d 475 (1985).
181. 693 P.2d at 475-76.
182. Id. at 476.
183. Id. at 477.
184. Id. at 480 (The Kansas Supreme Court reaffirmed this finding in State v. Hodges,
239 Kan. 63, 716 P.2d 563, 570-71 (1986)).
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placed "undue emphasis on the immediate action of the deceased, and
obliterat[ed] the nature of the buildup of terror and fear which had been
systematically created over a long period of time. '"1s The dissent found
no immediate or imminent danger of harm'"s and apparently argued that
defendant should have retreated: "At the very least, defendant would
have had a five minute head start on the defendant [sic] had she failed to
return with the cigarettes.""' The retreat issue can be one of the most
difficult issues in the battered woman's claim of self-defense, but, given
appropriate circumstances," a lull in the attack should not preclude the
claim entirely.
Duty to Retreat. That one may use nondeadly force to repel an at-
tack without an obligation to retreat is well-accepted. 1" The majority of
jurisdictions hold that the innocent party has no duty to retreat and may
use deadly force if she reasonably believes that the attacker will kill her
or inflict great bodily harm.1" In the minority view, the defender is re-
quired to retreat, if she can safely do so, before resorting to deadly
force.19' Even in the minority jurisdictions, however, the defender need
not retreat if she cannot do so safely or is in her own home.1 2 Assuming
that a battered wife could show a reasonable perception of imminent and
lethal danger, she should not have a problem with the no-retreat rule in a
majority view jurisdiction.19s In a minority jurisdiction, however, she may
have some difficulties. First, even though the battered woman is usually
in her house when violence occurs," her attacker is not an intruder, but
an inhabitant of the house as well. This may affect her privilege not to
185. Id. at 479.
186. Id. at 480-81 (McFarland, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 481.
188. Appropriate circumstances should include proof of the other elements of a self-de-
fense claim (discussed in this article) coupled with specific evidence about this particular
defendant's situation (course of battering relationships, specific threats, other indicia of
likely violent attack).
189. W. LAFAVE, supra note 134, at 456, 460; R. PmKINs, supra note 134, at 1116-17.
190. W. LAFAvE, supra note 134, at 460-61; R. PERKINS, supra note 134, at 1127.
191. W. LAFAVE, supra note 134, at 461; R. PERHNS, supra note 134, at 1133.
192. W. LAFAVE, supra note 134, at 461; R. PERKINS, supra note 134, at 1133.
193. See, e.g., People v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552, 563 (1984) (defendant
had no duty to retreat when she was attacked in her own home and was not the initial
aggressor); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 821 (N.D. 1983) (if the facts and circum-
stances create an honest and reasonable belief in defendant's own mind that he cannot
safely retreat from a cohabitant-assailant, his use of deadly force is justified). See also State
v. Sales, 285 S.C. 113, 328 S.E.2d 619 (1985).
194. See THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDRO ME, supra note 9, at 150; R. DOBASH, supra note
6, at 122; Gelles, No Place to Go: The Social Dynamics of Marital Violence, in BATTERED
WOMEN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTiC VIOLENCE 48 (M. Roy ed. 1977).
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retreat in a few states." Second, the battered woman might need to ad-
dress her ability to retreat safely. Many factors, however, could affect
that ability, and the court and jury should consider them if presented.'"
D. Sex Bias and the "Reasonableness" Standard
As the previous sections indicate, a male viewpoint permeates the law
of self-defense. The common law of self-defense developed (and the mod-
em law continues with) a concept of self-defense that is based on male
notions of a 'fair fight,' of courageousness and cowardice, and of danger
and immediacy of harm.197 Some states use an objective test of reasona-
bleness in evaluating a self-defense claim. That is, the courts in those
states ask juries to decide how an ordinary, intelligent, and prudent per-
son would react under all of the circumstances in assessing the reasona-
bleness of the defendant's action.1es Other states have a so-called subjec-
tive standard. The courts in those states ask juries to decide whether the
defendant's perception of the danger and immediacy of the harm and the
amount of force used was reasonable, given all of the circumstances.'" In
195. See Walker, supra note 124, at 5-6; Bochnak, supra note 157, at 46-47. See, e.g.,
State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982); Carter v. State, 469 So. 2d 194 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); State v. Shaw, 185 Conn. 372, 441 A.2d 561 (1981); State v. Pontery, 19 N.J.
457, 117 A.2d 473 (1955); State v. Grierson, 96 N.H. 36, 69 A.2d 851 (1949) (all cases gener-
ally held that the privilege not to retreat in your own dwelling place does not apply when
the attacker is a co-occupant of the dwelling).
196. Bochnak, supra note 157, at 47, lists some of the considerations that a factfinder
might want to evaluate: physical factors such as the layout of the house, the weather, the
hours, what the defendant was wearing, whether she had money or car keys, etc.; and psy-
chological factors such as threats made by the victim, whether the defendant sought help
and was refused it in the past, the presence of children in the house, etc. Id.
197. See Crocker, supra note 128, at 126-27; Schneider & Jordan, supra note 113, at 14;
Schneider, supra note 7, at 635.
198. See W. L"AvE, supra note 134, at 455; Crocker, supra note 128, at 125; Butler &
Buda, supra note 124, at 370-71; Schneider & Jordan, supra note 113, at 16.
199. W. LAFAYv, supra note 134, at 455. This distinction between subjective and objec-
tive standards of self-defense was the key issue in State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D.
1983). In that case, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that a jury instruction setting
forth an objective standard for evaluation of the reasonableness of the defendant's belief in
the necessity of the use of deadly force in defending herself was in error: the standard is
subjective. Id. at 817-19. The court cited several cases in which courts held the standard to
be objective and several which courts found the standard to be subjective. Id. at 817-18. In
most of the cases surveyed for this article, the courts appeared to use the subjective stan-
dard if one of the parties raised the issue. See, e.g., State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 716 P.2d
563, 569 (1986) (adopting a subjective standard for self-defense claim when battered woman
syndrome is in issue); State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 719 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1986) (although
the court calls it a "hybrid" test, the key is the individual perception of the defendant);
People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360 (1985); Fielder v. State, 683
S.W.2d 565, 592 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312, 314-
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both cases, however, courts are using a male standard of reasonableness.
Yet, what is deemed to be reasonable for a man may not be so for a wo-
man (and vice-versa). In fact, as one author points out, "[flemale traits
have been viewed as the antithesis" 00 of logic and reasonableness. Being
female means being "emotional and incapable of rational thought."20 1
The Washington Supreme Court explicitly recognized this issue in
State v. Wanrow.202 Although defendant was not a battered woman, she
claimed self-defense in response to charges of second degree murder and
first degree assault.202 Four of the eight justices found the trial court's
instruction to the jury on self-defense defective for two reasons. First, the
instruction appeared to present an objective standard for self-defense,
while Washington state law provides for a subjective standard. 0' Second,
the court pointed out that the use of the male pronoun in the jury in-
struction left the "jury with the impression that the objective standard
. . . is that applicable to an altercation between two men."'2 " The court
continued:
care must be taken to assure that our self-defense instructions afford
women the right to have their conduct judged in light of the individual
physical handicaps which are the product of sex discrimination. To fail
to do so is to deny the right of the individual woman involved to trial by
the same rules which are applicable to male defendants.2 "
One can use an Illinois case, People v. White,20 7 to illustrate the male
orientation of a reasonableness standard. In that case, the victim had in
the past broken defendant's elbow, fractured her ribs, dislocated her el-
bow, given her cuts on the face from a broken bottle, and hit her on the
head with a car jack (leaving permanent scars). He had caused several
15 (1984); State v. Thomas, 13 Ohio App. 3d 211, 468 N.E.2d 763, 764-65 (1983); People v.
White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196, 199 (1980). But see Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d
761, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) and People v. Bush, 84 Cal. App. 3d 975, 148 Cal. Rptr.
430, 436 (1978) (standard appears to be objective).
200. Schneider, supra note 7, at 636.
201. Id.
202. 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
203. 559 P.2d at 550. Ms. Wanrow (who was 5'4", had a broken leg and was using a
crutch) shot the victim (a 6'2" man, who was intoxicated) when he entered the home where
she was staying, came up behind her, startled her, and refused to leave. The evidence
showed that the victim was purportedly a child molester who had tried to molest Ms.
Wanrow's son, and had successfully attacked other children. Id. at 550-51, 558.
204. Id. at 558. This would include facts and circumstances known to the defendant
before the actual killing.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
207. 90 I1. App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196 (1980).
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injuries that required surgery.2 " On the day of the killing, the victim
threatened defendant with a beating. She went into the bedroom and got
a gun. When the victim ran and walked toward her, she shot him.20' The
jury found that defendant's belief that deadly force was necessary to pre-
vent death or great bodily harm was not reasonable.21" The trial court
also refused to admit testimony on the battered woman syndrome.21 The
appellate court affirmed the conviction of voluntary manslaughter.2 12 Of
course, to second-guess the trier of fact in cases like this is impossible,
but the facts do seem to indicate that a very narrow view of reasonable-
ness defeats a potentially valid claim of self-defense.
In order to remedy this problem, some scholars (feminist and other-
wise) have proposed standards or tests, other than the reasonable man
standard, for the courts to use in self-defense cases. One suggested ap-
proach is a sex-neutral standard. The reasonable man standard purports
to be sex-neutral, but as illustrated above, it may not be so in the self-
defense area. The proposed standard would be an individualized ap-
proach to the defendant's self-defense claim. The court and the jury
would focus on the battered woman's personal experiences with violence
at the hands of her abuser. The defense would use expert testimony to
challenge commonly held beliefs about the battered woman and her situa-
tion.2 13 The question would be: did this person act in a manner that was
reasonable for this individual? As other authors have argued, however,
this test raises a sex based stereotyping problem. By focusing on the indi-
vidual characteristics of the battered woman, we run the risk of empha-
sizing the weaknesses and idiosyncrasies of the female sex in general and
the battered woman in particular. This test may actually reinforce the
very stereotyped myths that the individualization test attempts to
avoid.21 4
A second approach is the creation of an altogether separate defense
based on the battered woman syndrome. This defense would be a 'subset'
of the self-defense claim, available only to battered women. The court
and the jury would determine if the defendant's actions were reasonable
for a battered woman. Of course, the court would require the defendant
to show that she is a battered woman and that she, her abuser, and their
208. 414 N.E.2d at 198.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 199.
211. Id. at 200.
212. Id. at 201.
213. See, e.g., Bochnak, supra note 157, at 42-43; Schneider, supra note 7, at 639-40.
214. This criticism is the major thrust of Phyllis Crocker's recent article. Crocker, supra
note 128, at 136-37. However, critics have expressed this concern for many years. See, e.g.,
Meyers, Battered Wives, Dead Husbands, STuDENT LAWYER, March 1978, at 46, 48.
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relationship at least generally fit the pattern of the syndrome. "' This
proposed separate standard is also subject to criticism. First, this test cre-
ates some of the same problems as the individualization approach because
it may tend to perpetuate and renew stereotypes about women and bat-
tered women.21 Second, it appears to substitute one unsatisfactory stan-
dard (reasonable man) for another (reasonable battered woman). A wo-
man with a history of abuse must fit into the pigeonhole of the typical
battering relationship. She should be passive, stay-at-home, never fight
back, never leave her abuser, and the like. If she does not fit into this
narrow class of persons, the defense is not available to her.2 ' Third, crit-
ics have raised the issue of equal protection in this context. Although the
reasonable man standard arguably violates the equal protection rights of
women in self-defense cases, 2'8 a "reasonable battered woman" standard
may violate the same rights for male homicide defendants and male vic-
tims.22 ' One article notes that the Supreme Court has held that when a
gender-neutral standard will serve the state's purpose in remedying sex
based discrimination a state may not use a classification based on sex.2"
215. As one author notes, this seems to be the approach that courts actually take when a
battered woman presents evidence of her victim's abusive behavior along with a claim of
self-defense. Crocker, supra note 128, at 144-45 and cases cited therein.
216. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
217. Crocker, supra note 128, at 149-50; "The debate becomes whether the defendant is
entitled to claim that she defended herself, not whether she was reasonable to do so." Id.
Another concern is that the creation of a reasonable battered woman defense would auto-
matically excuse spouse murders committed by battered women. See Bochnak, supra note
157, at 42-43 (The past abuse does not and should not justify the killing, it simply helps to
explain the woman's beliefs and perceptions at the time); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d
811, 820 n.8 (N.D. 1983) ("the law of self-defense will not be judicially orchestrated to ac-
commodate a theory that the existence of battered woman syndrome in an abusive relation-
ship operates in and of itself to justify or excuse a homicide"); State v. Kelly, 33 Wash. App.
541, 544, 655 P.2d 1202, 1203 (1982) ("The existence of the syndrome in a marriage does not
itself establish the legal right of the wife to kill the husband . . ").
218. Buda & Butler, supra note 124, at 380-81; Schneider & Jordan, supra note 113, at
20-21. Both authorities cite the Wanrow decision, which explicitly recognized the equal pro-
tection threat to women inherent in the reasonable man standard for self-defense. State v.
Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548, 549 (1977).
219. See Rittenmeyer, Of Battered Wives, Self-Defense and Double Standards of Jus-
tice, 9 J. CrM. JusT. 389, 394-95 (1981); Butler & Buda, supra note 124, at 378-79; Note,
Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide? 24 WAYNE L. Rav. 1705, 1721 (1978).
220. Buda & Butler, supra note 124, at 379 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197(1976)) (Gender classifications must serve important government objectives and be substan-
tially related to the achievement of those objectives. State statute, establishing different
legal drinking ages, was invalid because statistics showing higher percentage of males in-
volved in drunk-driving incidents was insufficient to meet the test and gender-neutral meth-
ods were available.); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (Statute requiring husbands, but
not wives, to pay alimony was unconstitutional if gender-neutral alternative would serve to
alleviate problem of past discrimination).
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A third possibility is the creation of a separate standard for self-de-
fense based on a reasonable woman's (not necessarily a reasonable bat-
tered woman) perception of danger, harm, and force.2" This has the ad-
vantage of allowing all women (not just battered women) equal access to
the claim of self-defense. This standard, however, is subject to the criti-
cisms of sex stereotype reinforcement and possible equal protection viola-
tion. An advocate of this approach also notes a unique problem with the
'reasonable woman' test. As an objective test, this standard should be uni-
versal, unbiased, and completely neutral. In our society and legal system,
however, this standard of objectivity has traditionally been the male no-
tion of objectivity. We do not have a working concept of female objectiv-
ity untainted by the male viewpoint. As Phyllis Crocker, the proponent
of this test, points out, a woman's experiences as an individual and as a
battered woman "are not sex-neutral: they are sex-specific, sex-linked and
sex-charged. '223 A woman's reaction in a situation in which a man threat-
ens her, particularly her spouse or boyfriend, will be intrinsically and sig-
nificantly different than that of a man in a similar situation. The equal
protection argument that the reasonable woman standard only empha-
sizes the differences between men and women may be unavoidable in
these cases. This argument, however, might be answered by pointing out
that this is not an area where a sex neutral standard will remedy the
discrimination inherent in the proof of a self-defense claim.
Finally, of course, it should be noted that many legal thinkers and writ-
ers object to any change in the existing law. In their view, the reasonable
man standard for self-defense claims adequately protects all parties in-
volved. To change the standard would amount to a declaration of an open
season on, or a license to kill, all abusive or battering men, regardless of
individual circumstances.28 ' A change of the standard would not protect
the victims of homicide. It might lead to false assertions of self-defense
by all wives who kill their husbands.22 5 Arguably this has already hap-
pened in a number of cases.226 Yet, the trier of fact should still be able to
221. Crocker, supra note 128, at 152.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 151.
224. See Meyers, supra note 214, at 47-48; Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide?, supra
note 219, at 1731, cited in Note, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 895, 930 n.190 (1981).
225. See supra note 213.
226. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) and State v.
Leaphart, 673 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) (defendants hired killers to murder vic-
tims); Strong v. State, 251 Ga. 540, 307 S.E.2d 912 (1983) (evidence tended to show that
victim may have been-acting defensively at time of stabbing); People v. Minnis, 118 111. App.
3d 345, 455 N.E.2d 209 (1983) (evidence unclear, but defendant apparently strangled victim
while he slept, then dismembered the victim's body and disposed of it in various dump-
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evaluate the circumstances and refuse to recognize a spurious claim.
IV. EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Introduction
The case law addressing the phenomenon of the battered woman syn-
drome is relatively new. Only in the past decade have defense attorneys
raised the issue. Due to increased public awareness and understanding of
the scope and severity of the wife abuse problem, state courts and clinical
psychologists began to grapple with the concept of the battered woman
syndrome in the latter 1970s. 27 In time, attorneys began to offer expert
testimony on the existence of, and the effects resulting from, the battered
woman syndrome in cases in which female clients had killed or injured
their abusers. The attorneys offered evidence to establish a woman's state
of mind when presenting a self-defense claim or when attempting to
prove a lesser offense.5 8 Expert evidence is often crucial to a battered
woman's claim of self-defense because (as previous sections indicate) soci-
ety widely subscribes to the myths surrounding the abusive relationship.
This includes not only jurors, but prosecutors and judges."' The expert
can break down some of these barriers in appropriate cases. The debate
concerning the admissibility of expert testimony on the subject of the
battered woman syndrome has centered on several issues: general accept-
ance of the syndrome within the scientific community; relevance of such
testimony; whether the syndrome is beyond the understanding of the av-
erage juror; and the possible prejudicial impact of the testimony. 30
The courts have split on the question of allowing expert testimony
sters); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981) (evidence showed defendant probably the
aggressor).
227. See THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 9 (describing the trend and de-
velopment of the battered woman syndrome since the latter 1970's); see also People v. Pow-
ell, 102 Misc. 2d 775, 781, 424 N.Y.S.2d 626, 630-31 (1980) (theory of the battered woman
syndrome and learned helplessness as applied to battered women wai not generally availa-
ble before 1979); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981) (court stated that re-
search on the battered woman syndrome is in its infancy); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407
A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979); State v. Dozier, 163 W. Va. 192, 255 S.E.2d 552 (1979).
228. See State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364, 375-77 (1984) (court held that expert
testimony is admissible to show defendant's state of mind and that she was in imminent
danger of death or serious injury); People v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d at 217 (court held that
expert testimony is admissible to show wife's emotional condition and why she dismembered
her husband's body); Macpherson, Ridolfi, Sternberg & Wiley, Expert Testimony, in
WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES 87, 93-96 (E. Bochnak ed. 1981). See also notes 229-33 infra
and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
230. E.g., Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 626; State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d
137 (1981); Kelly, 478 A.2d at 364.
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about the battered woman syndrome, but the trend is in favor of admissi-
bility. 31 A survey of the most recent case law shows that twenty-two
cases support the admissibility of expert testimony, 23  while only nine
cases disallow the expert evidence.2 s The reasons for admitting or disal-
lowing expert testimony, however, vary with the facts and circumstances
of each case. The following section will discuss the path a court typically
will take in addressing the admissibility of expert testimony on the bat-
tered woman syndrome, particularly in a homicide case.
B. Traditional Standards
In determining whether expert testimony is admissible in any case,
courts generally will require that the testimony meet the three criteria set
forth in Dyas v. United States,234 or the criteria set forth in rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.2" The following discussion will analyze
the admissibility of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome
231. Compare the following cases that support admission: Ibn-Tamas v. United States,
407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); State v. Hun-
dley, 236 Kan. 461, 693 P.2d 475 (1985); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984);
and State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 719 P.2d 1268 (1986); with the following which disallow
the expert evidence: Mullis v. State, 248 Ga. 338, 282 S.E.2d 334 (1981); and State v.
Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981); and Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374
(Wyo. 1981).
232. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979); Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d
761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Borders v. State, 433 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Strong v. State, 251 Ga. 540,
307 S.E.2d 912 (1983); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); People v. Minnis,
118 Ill. App. 3d 345, 455 N.E.2d 209 (1983); State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 716 P.2d 563
(1986); State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 693 P.2d 475 (1985); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892
(Me. 1981); May v. State, 460 So. 2d 778 (Miss. 1984); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424
A.2d 171 (1980); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984); State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M.
247, 719 P.2d 1268 (1986); People v. Emick, 103 A.2d 643, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1984); People
v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 358, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1985); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811
(N.D. 1983); State v. Thomas, 13 Ohio App. 3d 211, 468 N.E.2d 763 (1983); State v. Kelly,
102 Wash. 2d 188, 685 P.2d 564 (1984); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312
(1984); State v. Dozier, 163 W. Va. 192, 255 S.E.2d 552 (1979); State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d
485, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983).
233. IlbnTamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); Mullis v. State, 248 Ga. 338,
282 S.E.2d 334 (1981); People v. White 90 I1 App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196 (1980); Fultz v.
State, 439 N.E.2d 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984); People v. Powell, 102 Misc. 2d 775, 424 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1980); State v. Thomas, 66
Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981); Fielder v. State, 683 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App. Ct.
1985); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981).
234. 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977); see Hawthorne v. State,
408 So. 2d 801, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) and Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626,
632, 633 (D.C. 1979) (both cases adopting Dyas three-fold test for admissibility).
235. FED. R. EvID. 702; see State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312, 315 (1984)
(follows Federal Rule 702 to determine admissibility of expert testimony).
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under the Dyas test, and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Under the Dyas test the party seeking to introduce the expert testi-
mony must meet the following three criteria: (1) "the subject matter
'must also be so distinctively related to some science, profession, business
or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average laymen;' ,,6 (2)
"'the witness must have sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience in that
field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will
probably aid the trier in his search for truth;' ,,s37 and (3) that "expert
testimony is [admissible only) if 'the state of the pertinent art or scien-
tific knowledge. .. permit[s] a reasonable opinion to be asserted... by
an expert.' " Thus, the subject of the testimony must lend itself to ex-
pertise, the proffered expert must be qualified to give it, and the expert
must have studied the subject in a manner that will justify expert
testimony.
Beyond the Ken. The first requirement of the Dyas test is that the
subject matter be beyond the understanding of the average layman.139 At
least four courts have admitted expert testimony by explicitly basing the
admission on the finding that the battered woman syndrome is beyond
the understanding of the average person.240 More specifically, these courts
admitted expert testimony (1) to dispel the common misconception that a
normal or reasonable person would not remain in such an abusive rela-
tionship;24" (2) for the specific purpose of bolstering the defendant's posi-
236. 376 A.2d at 832 (quoting Fennekohl v. United States, 354 A.2d 238 (D.C. 1976))
(emphasis in original).
237. Id. (quoting Fennekohl, 354 A.2d at 238) (emphasis in original).
238. Id. (quoting Fennekohl, 354 A.2d at 238). See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EvI-
DENCE § 13, 33 (E. Cleary ed. 1984) (McCormick recognizes the three-part test of Dyas, but
advocates the admission of expert testimony even when the jurors have a general knowledge
of the issues) and 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 702[021, 702-08
(1981) [hereinafter J. WEINSTEIN] (Weinstein disagrees with the 'beyond the ken' standard
stating that "even when jurors are well equipped to make judgments on the basis of their
common knowledge and experience, experts may have specialized knowledge to bring to
bear on the same issue which would be helpful.").
239. 376 A.2d at 832.
240. State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984) (understanding
phenomenon of battered woman syndrome is not within competence of an ordinary person);
Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (1981) (exclusion of expert testimony
was improper because behavior of battered women is beyond the ken of jurors); Hawthorne
v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (expert testimony would aid jurors
because they would not otherwise understand why a battered woman would remain with her
mate); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 635 (D.C. 1979) (expert testimony on
syndrome would supply an interpretation of facts that is not within understanding of lay
person).
241. Smith, 247 Ga. at 619, 277 S.E.2d at 683; Hawthorne, 408 So. 2d at 807; see also
Comment, The Battered Woman Syndrome in Illinois: Admissibility of Expert Testimony,
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tion and lending credibility to her version of the facts;4 '2 and (3) to show
the reasonableness of the defendant's fear that she was in imminent peril
of death or serious bodily injury.243 In contrast, the courts that disallow
expert testimony base their reasoning on the belief that the average juror
can comprehend the unique fears of the battered woman., 4' In addition, a
few courts have stated that the 'battered woman syndrome' was not suffi-
ciently developed as a matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge
to warrant expert testimony and its prejudicial impact outweighed its
probative value.245
The majority of the courts2" that have considered the issue have fol-
11 S. ILL. U.L.J. 137, 139 (1986) (comments on how women are not "free to leave" and how
women become psychologically locked into their situation); Comment, Expert Testimony on
Battered Woman Syndrome: Its Admissibility in Spousal Homicide Cases, 19 SUFFOLK U.L.
Rav. 877, 880-81 (1985) (explains that a battered woman falling within the symptoms of the
syndrome "often feels that she cannot leave her spouse because of social conditioning,
shame, self-blame, and external social and economic conditions").
242. Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 634.
243. State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 188, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984) (testimony explains
reasonableness of her fear and enables jury to overcome stereotyped impressions about
women who remain in abusive relationships); see also State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d
364, 377 (1984) (testimony will aid jury in determining whether a reasonable person would
have believed imminent danger to her life existed); Smith, 247 Ga. at 619, 277 S.E.2d at 683
(expert testified that victims of battered woman syndrome believe that their husbands are
capable of killing, that no escape is possible, and that if they leave, their husbands will find
them and hurt them even more); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981) (testimony
may have a substantial bearing on woman's perceptions and behavior at time of killing, and
it is central to her claim of self-defense); Hawthorne, 408 So. 2d at 807 (testimony offered to
show that for her to have remained in home and to believe that her life and lives of her
children were in imminent danger was reasonable); Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 634 (Dr.
Walker's testimony showed that victim's actions provoked a state of fear which led defend-
ant to believe she was in imminent danger, and thus she responded in self-defense).
244. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981)
(expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome is within the understanding of the
jury); Mullis v. State, 248 Ga. 338, 339, 282 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1981) (reasonable fears of
defendant could be comprehended by an average juror); People v. Powell, 102 Misc. 2d 775,
781, 424 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1980) (expert testimony does not add anything to
defendant's defense since jury already had heard the testimony of abuse).
245. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 140 (" 'battered wife syndrome' is not
sufficiently developed, as a matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge, to warrant
testimony under the guise of expertise; and its prejudicial impact outweighs its probative
value"); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981) (excluded testimony on the bat-
tered woman syndrome since the state of the art was not adequately demonstrated).
246. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E. 678 (1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d
892 (Me. 1981); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980); State v. Dozier, 163 W.
Va. 192, 255 S.E.2d 552 (1979); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); see also Comment, Self-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial, 20 CAL. W.L.
Rev. 485, 499 (1984).
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lowed the landmark decision of Ibn-Tamas v. United States.4 7 This was
the first case to address the 'beyond the ken' requirement in detail and
the court held that the subject matter of the battered woman syndrome
was beyond the ken of the average layman.2 " More specifically, the court
held that the testimony "would have supplied an interpretation of the




In Ibn-Tamas, defendant, who was four months pregnant, testified that
she shot her husband shortly after he had severely beaten her and
threatened her with a pistol.250 Since the deceased did not have a weapon
at the time defendant shot him, the prosecution argued that defendant
simply had endured enough of her husband's abuse and decided to shoot
him at point blank range even though he lay wounded on the floor from a
previous shot.251 The defense argued that the expert testimony on bat-
tered women was relevant and should be admitted. It would help the jury
appraise the credibility of appellant's contention that she perceived her-
self to be in imminent danger from her husband and that she shot him in
self-defense. s 52 The trial court refused to permit this expert testimony,
stating that it would invade the province of the jury."'
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, however, agreed with the
defense and concluded that the expert's testimony could serve at least
two basic functions.2 " First, the testimony would strengthen Mrs. Ibn-
Tamas' general credibility in responding to cross examination designed to
show that her testimony about the relationship with her husband was im-
plausible.265 Second, expert evidence would support her testimony that
her husband's actions provoked such a state of fear that she believed that
she was in imminent danger, and thus she responded by shooting her hus-
band in self-defense.2 " Therefore, the appellate court in Ibn-Tamas rec-
ognized that the expert's testimony that battered women are afraid of
their batterers, but do not leave them because they believe that their men
247. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
248. Id. at 630.
249. Id. at 634-35.
250. Id. at 630.
251. Id. at 631.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 634. Upon remand for a trial court determination of admissibility, under the
second and third parts of the test for admissibility, the trial court found that "defendant
failed to establish a general acceptance by the expert's colleagues of the methodology used
in the expert's study. of battered women." The appellate court upheld this finding. Ibn-
Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893, 894 (D.C. 1983).




will find them and hurt them even more, is an inference that is beyond
the ken of the average laymen. 5 7 In short, without the expert testimony,
jurors ordinarily could not draw this conclusion for themselves.
Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court, in Smith v. State,'" held that
the battered woman syndrome was beyond the ken of the average lay per-
son.2' 5 More specifically, the court found that "the expert's testimony ex-
plaining why a person suffering from battered woman's syndrome would
not leave her mate, would not inform police or friends, and would fear
increased aggression against herself, would be such conclusions that ju-
rors could not ordinarily draw for themselves."260 The Florida Court of
Appeals also followed this line of reasoning in Hawthorne v. State.2" The
Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Allery,'6' held that the phenome-
non was not within the competence of the ordinary layman, and that the
defense should have the option to explain the feelings of the battered
woman in order to aid the jury's understanding of why women remain in
relationships in which they are abused.26' The New Jersey Supreme
Court, in State v. Kelly,'" held that expert testimony was essential to the
jury's understanding that Mrs. Kelly's failure to leave her husband was
very much part and parcel of her life as a battered wife.26 Mrs. Kelly, a
victim of frequent and severe beatings, killed her husband with a pair of
scissors following an altercation on the street.2" The court recognized
that an average juror would be relatively helpless in comprehending why
a battered woman would react in this particular manner. Thus, the court
stated that a battering relationship embodies psychological and societal
features that are not well understood by lay observers, and therefore is
suitable for explanation through expert testimony.267
257. Id. See also the discussion of this fear, supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
258. 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981).
259. Id. at 619, 277 S.E.2d at 683; see also State v. Anaya 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981)
(holding that testimony was more helpful than confusing to the jury); Hawthorne v. State,
408 So. 2d 801, 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (an expert will aid the jury in understanding
why a battered woman would remain in an abusive relationship); Ibn-Tamas v. United
States, 407 A.2d at 634, 635 (testimony would have supplied an interpretation of the facts
that differed from ordinary lay perception).
260. 247 Ga. at 619, 277 S.E.2d at 683; see also State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 719 P.2d
1268, 1274 (1986); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (1984).
261. 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (court admitted expert testimony to aid
jury in understanding why a battered woman would remain in an abusive relationship).
262. 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984) (wife shot her husband after suffering from
periodic pistol whippings, assaults with knives, and beatings with a tire iron).
263. 682 P.2d at 316.
264. 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984).
265. 478 A.2d at 378.
266. Id. at 369.
267. Id. at 379.
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More recently, the New Mexico Court of Appeals, in State v. Gal-
legos,2' admitted such evidence, holding that "[ejxpert testimony is ap-
propriate when the subject of the inquiry is one which jurors of normal
experience could not decide without the technical assistance of an indi-
vidual who possesses particular knowledge of the subject by reason of
skill, experience or education."'' 2 9 A New York supreme court, in People
v. Torres,"7' also admitted expert testimony on the battered woman syn-
drome, recognizing that the average layman has numerous misconceptions
concerning the options available to a victim of domestic violence.2' The
court stated that the expert's specialized knowledge in the area of family
violence would properly assist the jury in understanding the unique pres-
sures faced by the battered woman and enable the jury to disregard their
prior erroneous beliefs.272 The Kansas Supreme Court, in State v.
Hodges,'73 followed the modern trend and admitted expert testimony on
the battered woman syndrome. The court found that expert testimony
would help to rectify misperceptions that the ordinary lay person has
about battered women. The court cited some examples of these common
myths: that battered women are free to leave their abusers at any time or
that battered women are masochistic so they provoke and enjoy being
beaten.' 7'
On the other hand, some courts are not as willing to allow expert testi-
mony concerning battered women to be heard by the jury. For example,
the Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Thomas,'75 found that the expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome was inadmissible because it
was "not distinctly related to some science, profession or occupation so as
to be beyond the ken of the average lay person.' 27 It is worth noting,
however, that at this time, the research on the battered woman syndrome
was in its youth and much statistical data was still in the preparation
stage. Therefore, since the literature on the subject matter of battered
women has expanded significantly, the decision might be different today.
Similarly, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in Buhrle v. State,'" held that
an expert's opinions would not be of aid to the jury because of the confus-
268. 104 N.M. 247, 719 P.2d 1268 (1986).
269. 719 P.2d at 1274.
270. 128 Misc. 2d 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1985).
271. 488 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
272. Id.
273. 239 Kan. 63, 716 P.2d 563 (1986).
274. 716 P.2d at 567.
275. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981) (defendant suffered repeated episodes of
physical abuse from her common-law husband which eventually lead to her shooting and
killing of her husband).
276. 423 N.E.2d at 139.
277. 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981).
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ing nature of the proffered testimony.2 s Although the court excluded the
testimony in Buhrle, it stated that "we are not saying that this type of
expert testimony is not admissible; we are merely holding that the state
of the art was not adequately demonstrated . ..and because of inade-
quate foundation, the proposed opinions would not aid the jury." ''
Again, this case might have come out differently today due to increased
research and resulting scientific knowledge about the battered woman
syndrome.
The trend indicates that the majority of courts have held that the bat-
tered woman phenomenon is beyond the ken of the average juror and
that expert testimony therefore is admissible. 2 ' Not only does this testi-
mony help to explain why a battered woman does not leave her mate, nor
inform family, friends, or the police, but it also helps the jury -understand
why a woman could be driven to kill her own husband. Thus, the battered
woman syndrome can be said to encompass a matter sufficiently complex
to be beyond the understanding of the ordinary lay person.
Skill, Knowledge, or Experience of the Expert Witness. After
a court determines that the subject of expert testimony is beyond the ken
of the average juror, the court addresses whether the expert possesses the
necessary qualifications to testify. A court will consider certain factors in
determining whether an expert is qualified in the area of domestic abuse.
These factors include the amount of time and practical experience the
expert has in the area of family violence, the recognition and the accept-
ance of that expert's work in the professional community, and any previ-
ous courtroom testimony the expert has given on the subject of domestic
violence.2 1 In addition, specifically on the topic of the battered woman
syndrome, the expert must have a working knowledge of the syndrome to
determine if a defendant fits into the pattern. Courts have permitted
clinical psychologists,2 8 2 social workers,282 and psychiatrists2 " to testify
about family violence. Much of the testimony on the battered woman
syndrome has been offered to the courts by one witness in particular, Dr.
278. Id. at 1377; see also Mullis v. State, 248 Ga. 338, 339, 282 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1981)
(court in Mullis held that to exclude expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome
"where the testimony sought to be admitted related to the reasonable fears of a defendant
which could be comprehended by the average juror" was not error).
279. Buhrle, 627 P.2d at 1378.
280. See supra notes 242-76 and accompanying text.
281. Comment, Self-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial, 20 CAL. W.L. REV.
485, 507 (1984).
282. People v. Minnis, 118 Ill. App. 3d. 345, 455 N.E.2d 209 (1983).
283. State v. Nunn, 356 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).
284. State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980).
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Lenore Walker. 8 According to one author, Dr. Walker's qualifications
could serve as a model in this area.28 5 In the landmark decision of Ibn-
Tamas,'2 87 discussed previously, the defense offered the testimony of Dr.
Walker to describe the battered woman syndrome and to compare appel-
lant with other battered women that Dr. Walker had identified and stud-
ied. The court in Ibn-Tamas recognized Dr. Walker's skills and experi-
ence and admitted the testimony.
2 88
This author's opinion is that without such testimony the average juror
would not understand why a battered woman is psychologically unable to
leave the battering relationship and why she continues to live with a man
who terrorizes her. Furthermore, as the majority of cases indicate, expert
testimony is extremely valuable to the jury in determining whether a bat-
tered woman's fear and her claim of self-defense are reasonable.
State of the Art. Once a court determines that the subject matter of
the battered woman syndrome is beyond the ken of the average juror and
that the expert is successfully qualified, the final step addressed by a
court is whether the state of the art of the subject matter is able to sup-
port an expert opinion."' This third requirement of the Dyas test is
linked to whether a particular methodology is generally accepted. This
$general acceptance' standard was first set forth in Frye v. United
States:2 0 "While courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.""'
The basis for this requirement is that expert testimony, without a recog-
nized theoretical basis, will possibly mislead or perhaps deceive the jury.
In Ibn-Tamas, 2' the court found that the subject matter of the bat-
285. The following cases have received testimony from Dr. L. Walker: Hawthorne, 408
So. 2d at 801; Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 626; Buhrle, 627 P.2d at 1374.
286. Comment, A Woman, a Horse, and a Hickory Tree: The Development of Expert
Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome in Homicide Cases, 53 UMKC L. REv. 386,
400. Dr. Walker received her doctorate in psychology from Rutgers University. She is a
licensed psychologist in private practice. She has been an assistant professor of psychology
at Rutgers Medical School and has conducted numerous research projects dealing with bat-
tered women. Id.
287. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
288. 407 A.2d at 634.
289. Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C. 1977). See C. McCoRmIcK, supra
note 233, at 34. McCormick recognizes the restriction that evidence is admissible only if the
court believes that the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge permits a reasonable
opinion to be asserted. Id.
290. 293 F. 1013 (1923).
291. Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
292. 407 A.2d at 626.
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tered woman syndrome was beyond the ken of the average juror and that
the expert witness was qualified.' Upon remand, however, the trial court
found that "defendant failed to establish a general acceptance by the ex-
pert's colleagues of the methodology used in the expert's study of 'bat-
tered women."'2" The trial court's finding was subsequently upheld on
appeal.2 5 Thus, the court excluded the testimony on the battered woman
syndrome because the defense failed to lay the proper foundation and
prove that the study had been generally accepted. More recently, how-
ever, a New York supreme court stated in People v. Torres:2"
[T]he theory underlying the battered woman's syndrome has indeed
passed beyond the experimental stage and gained a substantial enough
scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility .... [N]umerous articles
and books have been published about the battered woman's syndrome;
and recent findings of researchers in the field have confirmed its presence
and thereby indicated that the scientific community accepts its underly-
ing premises 2 7
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Kelly,29s recognized three
ways a proponent of scientific evidence can prove its general acceptance:
(1) through the expert's testimony; (2) by authoritative scientific and le-
gal writings; and (3) by judicial opinions indicating the expert's premise
has been generally accepted.2' Although the judicial opinions are split
concerning the scientific acceptability of the syndrome, 300 the court ruled
293. Id. at 634-35.
294. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893, 894 (D.C. 1983).
295. Id. at 894.
296. 128 Misc. 2d 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1985).
297. 488 N.Y.S.2d at 363. In Torres, defendant's husband repeatedly struck, beat, and
threatened defendant. On the night of the killing, the savageness of defendant's husband's
behavior convinced defendant that he meant to kill her. Believing that no other way out
existed, defendant grabbed a gun and shot deceased three times while he sat in a chair. Id.
at 361. The court in Torres applied a two-prong test to determine the admissibility of expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome. First, the court considered whether the opinion
testimony, based on professional or scientific knowledge, was within the understanding of an
ordinary juror. Id. at 362. Second, the court considered whether a sufficient state of the art
existed to permit expert testimony. After analyzing the facts, the court held that the testi-
mony was outside the range of ordinary training and intelligence and had gained a substan-
tial enough scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility. Id. at 363.
298. 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984).
299. 478 A.2d at 387.
300. Compare State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 716 P.2d 563 (1986) and State v. Anaya, 438
A.2d 892 (Me. 1981) (courts in both cases accepted expert testimony without reservation),
with Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), and Ibn-Tamas v.
United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979) (courts remanded both cases to the trial court to
determine the scientific acceptability of expert testimony), and with Buhrle v. State, 627
P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981), and State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981)
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that the battered woman syndrome had a sufficient scientific basis to pro-
duce uniform and reasonable results. 01 Similarly, the Kansas Supreme
Court, in State v. Hodges,3 0 2 followed this reasoning, holding that the the-
ory underlying the battered woman syndrome has gained sufficient scien-
tific acceptance to warrant admissibility.30 3 Thus, according to the major-
ity of cases, the trend indicates that the syndrome has moved beyond the
experimental stage and developed enough general acceptance to warrant
admissibility.
C. Other Considerations
Showing that the special requirements for admission of expert testi-
mony are met is only the first stage in getting expert testimony admitted.
Courts will also consider questions of relevancy, materiality, prejudice,
and probative value in determining the admissibility of expert testimony
on the battered woman syndrome. The judge carefully weighs these con-
siderations and decides whether or not the evidence should be admitted
or excluded. The defense must establish that testimony about domestic
violence and about the defendant's life as a battered woman has proba-
tive value that is not substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury.s°' The prose-
cutor, on the other hand will argue that the testimony has no probative
value and that the jury should not be concerned with how women react in
similar domestic situations, reasoning that only the state of mind of the
individual defendant is relevant.305 In addition, the prosecutor will argue
that expert testimony diagnosing the defendant as a battered woman
should be excluded because the testimony will prejudice the prosecution's
case because it labels the deceased as a batterer.8 °e
The case law addressing the questions of relevancy, materiality,
prejudice, and probative value of the battered woman syndrome is split
among various jurisdictions. For example, in State v. Thomas,07 the Ohio
Supreme Court considered the issues of relevancy, materiality, and preju-
(both cases held that the subject was not sufficiently established as a matter of scientific
expertise).
301. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 380.
302. 716 P.2d at 563.
303. Id. at 569.
304. Compare Thomas, 423 N.E.2d at 140 (holding that expert testimony would stereo-
type defendant, causing the jury to become prejudiced) with Anaya, 438 A.2d at 894 (testi-
mony was highly probative and outweighed any prejudicial impact).
305. See Sternberg, Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battering, in WOMEN'S SELF-
DEFENSE CASES 210, 217 (E. Bochnak ed. 1981).
306. Id. at 219.
307. 423 N.E.2d at 137.
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dicial impact before affirming the trial court's exclusion testimony. The
court in Thomas held that the expert testimony was irrelevant to the self-
defense issue and that the prejudicial impact of the testimony outweighed
any probative value. 08 Likewise, the trial court in People v. White, ° re-
fused to allow evidence on the battered woman syndrome because the
subject lacked relevancy and materiality.
On the other hand, some courts have found such testimony relevant to
the defendant's self-defense claim. For example, the court in State v.
Kelly10 specifically held that expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome was relevant to Mrs. Kelly's state of mind and was admissible
to show she honestly believed she was in imminent danger of death."'
Similarly, the Main Supreme Judicial Court, in State v. Anaya, 12 found
that expert testimony on the battered wife syndrome would have been
highly probative and more helpful than confusing to the jury. 8 The
court also stated that the evidence "would have given the jury reason to
believe that the defendant's conduct was, contrary to the State's asser-
tions, consistent with her theory of self-defense."131
D. The Federal Rules of Evidence
Although the standard three-part test is still viable, the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 brought about a considerable
change in the common law approach to expert witness testimony.1 5 In
contrast to the traditional three-part test, rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence"' requires only that the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge assist the trier of fact. Modern evidence codes have
relaxed the limitations, discussed earlier, on the scope of expert testi-
mony. For example, a growing number of jurisdictions are now admitting
expert testimony on the ultimate issue in the case, whereas before the
308. Id. at 140.
309. 90 111. App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196 (1980).
310. 478 A.2d 364.
311. Id. at 377.
312. 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981).
313. Id. at 894.
314. Id.
315. See Comment, Expert Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome: Its Admissibil-
ity in Spousal Homicide Cases, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 877, 884 (commenting on how "the
scope of expert testimony [has] undergone considerable liberalization"); see generally C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 238, § 14, at 35 (commenting on the criticism of common law ap-
proach and adopting the liberalized view of the FED. R. EvID.).
316. FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
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enactment of the Federal Rules, these jurisdictions would have denied
such testimony because it invaded the province of the jury.""7 According
to one author, the traditional 'beyond-the-ken' criterion has been aban-
doned and courts are more willing to admit expert testimony that does no
more than sharpen the jury's common sense evaluation of the evidence.318
Thus, the key factor now is whether the testimony will help the jury, not
whether the subject matter is beyond the ken of the ordinary lay person.
In addition, many jurisdictions now allow an expert to give opinion testi-
mony based upon inadmissible evidence or in response to a hypothetical
question, whereas before, experts could only give opinion testimony based
on the facts in the record or firsthand knowledge.31' Thus, these changes
have actually expanded the scope of expert testimony and lessened the
burdens of admitting the testimony.
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence have modified the rules con-
cerning admissibility of expert testimony, the 'general acceptance in the
scientific community' criterion still creates a barrier in many jurisdic-
tions.20 For example, the Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Al-
lery,32' admitted expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome. Fol-
lowing the federal rule 702, the court in Allery not only considered the
qualifications of the expert and whether the testimony would help the
jury, but the court went a step further and considered whether the 'scien-
tific understanding' of the battered woman syndrome was sufficiently de-
veloped to admit expert testimony on the syndrome. s 2 In other words,
the court interpreted rule 702 to include the requirement of 'general ac-
ceptance' even though the rule remained silent on that issue.
This 'general acceptance' standard is derived from the language in Frye
v. United States.323 The test is whether the process, system, or theory on
which the evidence is based is "sufficiently established to have gained
317. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981) (this case focused on
the 'ultimate issue' question and the court admitted testimony on an ultimate issue when-
ever the expert concluded that jurors would not be able to draw the inference for them-
selves). But see Buhrle, 627 P.2d 1374 (holding that expert testimony would invade province
of jury); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 238, § 12, at 30-31; FED. R. EvID. 704 (testimony
that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable merely because it addresses the ultimate
issue). Opinions as to questions of law, however, are usually inadmissible. C. MCCoRMICK,
supra note 238, § 12, at 32.
318. Rossi, Modern Evidence and the Expert Witness 12 LITIGATION 18, 19 (1985).
319. C. McCORMICK, supra note 238, § 14, at 35-36; see FED. R. EvID. 703 (the facts or
data underlying an expert opinion need not be admissible if the facts or data are of the type
relied upon by experts in the particular field).
320. See Rossi, supra note 318, at 19-20.
321. 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984).
322. 68 P.2d at 315.
323. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. ' '3 2 4 The ex-
pert testimony on a certain area will not be admissible under Frye unless
the scientific community approves the new scientific procedures. This is
precisely what occurred in State v. Thomas,32 ' when the court excluded
expert testimony on the syndrome, concluding that courts had not gener-
ally accepted the battered woman syndrome.326 The question still re-
mains, however, whether this restrictive general acceptance test survives
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Rule 702 says absolutely nothing about the general acceptance stan-
dard. In fact, according to one well-known commentator,3 27 the silence of
the rule should be "regarded as tantamount to an abandonment of the
general acceptance standard."3 8 Moreover, this author also stated that
"Rule 702's failure of the Advisory Committee Notes to even mention the
Frye case must be considered significant."'3 2' These comments, considered
together with a reasonable reading of the federal rules themselves, seem
to indicate that the cornerstone of the test for admissibility of expert tes-
timony is the simple question: Will the testimony help the jury?
V. CONCLUSION
The use of expert testimony in homicide cases where an allegedly bat-
tered wife kills her abuser and then claims self-defense to a murder
charge is a controversial proposition. The evidence, however, shows that
women are frequently the victims of abuse, that patterns of behavior as-
sociated with battering relationships usually exist, and that modern
American society has been unable to understand or cope with the prob-
lem. This failure to deal with the issue of battering extends to the crimi-
nal justice system as a whole. It extends to police, prosecutors, judges,
and juries. Traditional notions of self-defense and traditional rules re-
garding admissibility of expert testimony do not transfer well to the bat-
tered woman's situation.
The law must take a realistic view of the physical and social differences
between men and women when evaluating a battered woman's claim of
self-defense to a murder charge. For example, the rule that a woman may
not use a weapon against an unarmed male assailant is absurd and arbi-
trary. Most men could kill a woman with their bare hands. Spouse abus-
ers can be particularly violent and destructive when enraged. We must
324. Id. at 1014.
325. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981).
326. Id. at 138.





consider the requirement of imminent or immediate danger for the exer-
cise of self-defense with the male-female differences in mind. Danger can
be imminent for a battered woman despite the fact that no actual attack
is in progress at the time she tries to defend herself. When a battered
woman is attacked in her own home, the law should not require her to
retreat before resorting to deadly force.
At the heart of the self-defense issue for a battered woman is the stan-
dard against which a battered wife's conduct is to be measured. In this
author's view, the 'reasonable woman' test for self-defense is the best
choice among the possibilities. This alternative is available to all women
on an equal basis; it does not explicitly foster certain female stereotypes
but merely acknowledges certain truths about our society and its reflec-
tion in the legal system; it is less susceptible to an equal protection chal-
lenge than a more narrow test; and, because it contains the requirement
of reasonableness or objectivity (albeit from the feminine perspective), it
does not permit wholesale murder of women-abusers;
In order to best implement such a significant change in the criminal
law, however, state legislatures, not merely the courts, should act in sev-
eral ways. First, criminal laws should specifically provide for a 'reasonable
woman' standard in statutes dealing with the law of self-defense, particu-
larly provisions regarding justification. Second, the evidence rules should
explicitly permit lay testimony on the history of an abusive relationship,
the nature and frequency of prior violent attacks, and the like. Third, the
legislatures should draft proper jury instructions, incorporating a reason-
able female standard, and the courts should use them in all cases where a
female defendant attempts to present a self-defense claim. The law-mak-
ers should give particular emphasis to the justification effect of a valid
claim of self-defense, rather than the mere reduction in the level of sever-
ity of the crime.
Finally, the courts must admit expert testimony to explain the battered
woman syndrome to the jurors. Such testimony could explain the pattern
of abusive relationships, clarify commonly misunderstood aspects of those
relationships, and debunk some of the myths surrounding battered
women. A woman offering such testimony would not have to show that
she fits the standard cookie-cutter shape of 'the battered woman,' but in
cases in which some elements of the syndrome are present, the evidence
would be helpful to the trier of fact.
This concept of helpfulness should be the key element in evaluating the
admissibility of expert testimony. If the defendant can convince the court
that portions of the battered woman syndrome are involved in her case,
the court should admit the evidence. The approach taken by the Federal
Rules of Evidence is a sound one. Even in jurisdictions following a more
traditional approach, however, expert testimony should be admissible. A
thoughtful evaluation of the literature should convince the courts that the
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battered woman syndrome is beyond the ken of the average laymen and
that the theory of the battered woman syndrome is well-researched and is
now well-recognized in the psychological community.
Perhaps, as society becomes more aware of the problem of battering
and of ways to prevent it, the incidence of such painful and distressing
cases will decrease. Until then, however, the law must deal-and deal
fairly-with the battered woman who strikes back at her abuser with
deadly results.

